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Establishing clear goals for a sustainable framework of good governance and development
based on increasing equality and citizen participation has been the main concern of the
government of Rwanda since the 1994 genocide. This was to be achieved by implementing
decentralization based on the principle of participation and empowerment of local
communities through the provision of mechanisms which encourage and motivate local citizen
to initiate and implement development activities based on local needs.
One particular interesting initiative has been the design of new institutional arrangements for
decentralization of political, fiscal and administrative institutions for the purpose of good
governance and, in particular, for poverty reduction. To attain this, strategic objectives were
implemented, these included:
 Enabling and reactivating local people to participate in initiating, making, implementing
and monitoring decisions and plans that concern them taking into account their local
needs.
 Strengthening accountability and transparency in Rwanda by making local leaders
directly accountable to the communities they serve. 
 Enhance the sensitivity and responsiveness of public administration to the local
environment by placing the planning, financing, management and control of service
provision at the point where services are provided. 
 Enhancing effectiveness and efficiency in the planning, monitoring and delivery of
services by reducing the burden from central government officials who are distanced
from the center where needs are felt and services delivered.
 Developing sustainable economic planning and management capacity at local levels that 
will serve as the driving engine for planning, mobilization and implementation of social, 
political and economic development to alleviate poverty. 
The aim of this study is to explore the linkage between the implantation of decentralization and 
poverty reduction. The implementation of the policy of decentralization for the purpose of 











terms of administrative, political and fiscal decentralization have managed to reduce poverty. 
On the other hand other aspects of decentralization have had little or no measurable impact. 
The test of the hypothesis revealed that: 
 The level of voter turnout as an indication of political decentralization is related weakly 
and negatively to poverty levels. This test also revealed that the relationship between 
the level of voter turnout and a change in poverty level is moderately strong and 
negative in rural districts. 
 The number of cooperatives in districts is correlated moderately strongly and negatively 
with subsequent changes in poverty.
 The district government income and expenditure per capita are very strongly related to
subsequent levels in poverty change.
 The level of education of district staff is moderately weak and positive, mostly in the
urban districts.
 Expenditure per capita on education, health, water and roads correlate very weakly with











CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
1.1. Introduction 
Establishing clear goals for a sustainable framework of good governance by increasing citizen
equality and participation in the country’s development has been the main concern of the
Government of Rwanda since the 1994 genocide. The desire to attain these goals led the
Government of Rwanda to undertake a number of political, administrative and economic
reforms (Ndahimana et al, 2002:7). The government’s intention was expressed firstly in the
Rwanda Vision 2020 document, then in the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper and, most
recently, in the Economic Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy (EDPRS) document.
One particularly interesting initiative has been the design of new institutional arrangements for
decentralization of political, fiscal and administrative institutions for the purpose of good
governance and, in particular, for poverty reduction (see Ndahimana et al, 2002; Republic of
Rwanda, 2000:7). In the years since these reforms began, there has been in fact a measurable
reduction in the extent of poverty in Rwanda. This study asks whether this is simply coincidence
or whether there is any evidence that decentralization actually contributed to this drop in
poverty.
1.2. Problem statement 
The policy of decentralization1 was formulated and adopted in May 2000 to ‘ensure political, 
economic, social, managerial/administrative and technical empowerment of local populations 
1
The policy of decentralization was adopted in May 2000 after broad consultation with different stakeholders through 












to fight poverty by participating in planning and management of their development process’ 
(Republic of Rwanda, 2000:9). In Rwanda, decentralization is based on the principle of 
participation and empowerment of local communities through the provision of mechanisms 
which encourage and motivate local citizens to initiate and implement development activities 
based on local needs. Participation by local actors in decision-making and policy making 
motivates local governments to consider local problems and increases effectiveness and 
efficiency in service delivery and responsiveness of officials to community needs.  The policy 
attempts to empower citizens and encourage maximum participation of local communities in 
decision making. Increased participation leading to more accountability, transparency, and 
responsiveness from local institutions is likely to bring about better policies that fit local needs 
and which are thus more likely to reduce poverty (Ndahimana et al, 2002; Republic of Rwanda, 
2000). 
Decentralization is thought by the Government of Rwanda to enhance participation, 
accountability, and responsiveness by enabling local citizens to elect their leaders2 (in elections 
for district, sector, cell and Village councils), by granting those leaders more autonomy (political 
and financial autonomy), by giving technical capabilities to local institutions to improve their 
responsiveness, and by mobilizing resources at the local level. Decentralization entails making 
local governments the driving force for planning, mobilization and implementation of social, 
political and economic development programmes. The policy has also introduced the principle 
                                                                                                                                                                             
country is in the middle of the second phase of implementation and among the issues to be addressed is the improvement of 
local people’s lives by initiating development at the grassroots level (Republic of Rwanda.  2000. National Decentralization 
Policy. Minaloc.  Kigali. 
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of shared responsibility between governors and the governed in the form of participatory 
decision-making (Ndahimana et al., 2002:7; Republic of Rwanda, 2000).  
Though Rwanda is a landlocked country, with an agriculturally based economy (about 80% of 
the population aged 16 and above are occupied in agriculture), and insufficient natural 
resources, it has recently registered positive results in poverty reduction. According to the first 
EICV Survey (Enquête Intégrale sur les Conditions de Vie des Ménage) conducted in 2000/2001, 
the percentage of the population considered poor was estimated at 60.4%. However, this 
Figure significantly declined to 56.9% as shown in the second EICV conducted in 2005/2006 
(National Institute of Statistics of Rwanda (NISR), 2006:2). However, there were important 
variations across the country. In rural areas poverty declined from 66.1% in 2000/2001 to 62.5% 
in 2005/2006. In urban areas poverty levels were also reduced, for example from 16.1% to 13% 
in Kigali city and from 46.5% to 41.5% in other urban areas for the same periods. The highest 
reduction score was observed in the Eastern Province and Northern Province where poverty 
headcounts decreased from 61.1% to 50.4% and from 66.9% to 62.7% respectively (NISR, 2006: 
4-6). 
1.3. Research question  
Given the recent reforms, the obvious question becomes whether the implementation of 
decentralization contributed to the observed reduction of poverty in any tangible way. Has 
decentralization had significant success in obtaining the poverty reduction objectives stated in 












1.4. Significance of the study       
Following the catastrophic experiences of Rwanda in 1994, most research on Rwanda has 
focused on the genocide and its consequences3. While some has focused on either poverty4 or 
decentralization in Rwanda, no research has specifically focused on the link between 
decentralization and poverty5. If this study finds evidence of a link, Rwanda could provide a 
model for other developing and African countries in this regard.   
1.5. Argument  
I argue that the participation of local citizens and their knowledge of the local situation 
contribute to more accurate identification and prioritization of human needs. This results in a 
more rational allocation of available resources for the attainment of poverty reduction 
objectives. Decentralized local and district governments are the institutional arrangement 
which provides these opportunities for people, including the poor and vulnerable. Planning 
approaches involving local people and based on knowledge of local circumstances create an 
enabling environment for local communities to participate in development decisions and 
activities. In this context decentralization is more likely to reduce poverty. The Government of 
Rwanda has, since 2002, designed various programmes and strategies setting poverty reduction 
as the most pressing objective. Programmes such as the government’s Poverty Reduction 
                                                           
3
 See for example Adelman and Suhrke.1999. Ed.; Mamdani, 2001 ; Pottier, 2002 ; Smith, 1999. 
4
 MINECOFIN-DS. 2002. Enquête sur les Conditions de Vie des Ménages (EICV):Rapport Général. Kigali; Service National de 
Recensement.2005. Situation De Bien-Etre Du Ménage. Essai de mesure à partir des caractéristiques de l’habitat issue du 
troisième recensement général de la population et de l’habitat. Kigali. MINECOFIN-DS. 2000. Enquête sur les indicateurs de 
développement (QUID). Kigali. MINECOFIN-DS.2003. Enquête sur les indicateurs de bien-être de base (QUIBB). Vol 1. Kigali. 
MINECOFIN. 2002. Un Profil de la Pauvreté au Rwanda : Un rapport basé sur les résultats de l’EICV 1999-2001. Kigali. 
5
 Poverty reduction is one of the five objectives to be achieved through decentralization. The decentralization policy has 












Strategy and the Economic Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy (EDPRS) were 
adopted in 2000 and 2006 respectively. In both programmes, decentralization of governing 
institutions and good governance are emphasized as essential tools for development. Local 
governments are key actors in the implementation of these policies.  
Hypothesis  
As has been argued by Braun and Grote (2000), lower levels of poverty are likely to be observed 
in countries where elections are held at the “third tier” level that is, at district level compared 
to countries where elections are only held at the central level of government.  
In the context of this study, I hypothesize that implementation of the policy of decentralization 
of institutions of government is linked to increased poverty reduction in Rwanda. However, at 
the national level Rwanda provides us with only a single case to study, which presents all the 
attendant problems of single case studies. Thus, I disaggregate the country into 30 newly 
decentralized units. I argue that those districts in which the government has decentralized 
responsibilities are those that will have reduced poverty more extensively.  
Concepts 
The key concepts in this study are decentralization and poverty. Various definitions of 
decentralization emerge from the literature. However for this study decentralization is defined 
as a transfer of responsibility from the centre to the sub-national bodies within a political 
system. Decentralization can appear as de-concentration or administrative decentralization 












decentralization (when fiscal responsibilities are transferred to a lower level of government 
enabling local influences over budgeting and financial decisions) and devolution or democratic 
decentralization (when there is a transfer of power and resources to lower levels of 
government which are largely or wholly independent of central government and democratic in 
some way  and to some degree)6. Although all three of these forms of decentralization can be 
implemented separately or in combination, the type of decentralization at the center of our 
analysis is devolution of power for the purpose of providing autonomy in political and resource 
management to local government. Thus decentralization in this study means devolution or 
democratic decentralization. These three terms will be used interchangeably. Thus, devolution 
can be defined as “meaningful autonomy devolved to local units of government that are 
accessible and accountable to the local citizenry, who enjoy political rights and liberty. It thus 
differs from the vast majority of earlier efforts at decentralization in developing areas, which 
extend back as far as 1950, but which were largely initiatives concerned with public 
administration, without any serious democratic component”(Blair, 2000:21; quoted in Johnson, 
2001:523). This definition implies that local governments are granted autonomy in planning and 
managing public affairs at local level with an extensive involvement of local citizens.  
Poverty is comprised of many components and can be defined differently according to the 
dimensions to be analyzed. While there is widespread consensus on the multidimensionality of 
poverty7 , the present study does not intend to focus on all dimensions because of the limited 
                                                           
6
 See Manor.1999. 
7
 The multidimensional aspect of poverty was adopted by the World Summit on Development held in Copenhagen in March 
1995. According to this definition, poverty entails lack of income and sufficient productive resources to insure viable livelihood; 
hunger and malnutrition; poor health, illiteracy; increased morbidity and mortality; unhealthy environment; social 












availability of data at local level. For the purpose of this study, poverty is defined as subsistence 
below the minimum requirements of food basket commodities in terms of income or 
consumption. This definition is based on consumption expenditure and defines poverty using a 
poverty line. Therefore, in this study individuals are defined as poor if their income is below an 
established poverty line and does not allow them access to basic food commodities sufficient to 
provide 2,500Kcal per adult and to meet their basic non-food necessities. For Rwanda the 
poverty line is set to Rwf 64,000 based on January 2001 prices to ensure comparability of the 
two surveys8.  
Logic  
In this study, the policy of decentralization is held constant: local governments in the country 
were created at the same time with identical organizational structures. What varies in this 
research is the level of implementation of the actual responsibilities of local governments and 
the degree of institutionalization of the policy. The study intends to investigate whether the 
implementation of decentralization has contributed to poverty reduction in Rwanda. This 
exploration of the relationship between decentralization and poverty reduction will proceed as 
follows: 
Firstly, the relationship between the implementation of decentralization and poverty reduction 
is analyzed by investigating the level of population participation in local governments. Here 
                                                                                                                                                                             
the destitution in which the poor live. For more details see: Banque Mondiale. 2001. Combattre la Pauvreté, Rapport sur le 
Développement dans le Monde. 2000/2001. Paris : ESKA. P.1. Mohammed, Sharif. Poverty Reduction- An Effective Means of 
Population Control: theory, Evidence and Policy. MPG Books Ltd, Bodmin, Cornwall. p.141. 
8
 For more details see, National Institute of Statistics of Rwanda. December 2006 (annexes1 and 2). See also David Hulme, 













much attention will be given to discovering if the level of poverty reduction is associated with 
the degree of participation of local people. 
Secondly, the impact of decentralization on poverty reduction is examined by investigating the 
level of responsiveness of local government. An exploration of the level of development 
investments in education, health, roads and water was used to assist an investigation of the 
impact of decentralization on poverty reduction. 
Thirdly, the capacity of decentralized units is examined with regard to their capability with 
regard to planning and running their local government affairs. 
Fourthly, an investigation of the capacity for resource mobilization will provide information 
regarding the capacity of local governments to undertake and implement programmes aiming 
at reducing poverty. 
Considering decentralization as the independent variable this study explores empirically how 
the implementation of decentralization policies has affected strategies for poverty reduction 
and the lives of local citizens.   


































1.6. Outlines of the study 
This study is organized as follows: Chapter One covers the research question, hypothesis and 
objectives of the study. Chapter Two covers the literature on the subject and Chapter Three 
presents the methodology used. Chapter Four investigates the topic of decentralization in 
detail.  Chapter Five examines poverty reduction in Rwanda and Chapter Six tests the linkage 
between decentralization and poverty reduction in the country.  Chapter Seven offers the 






















CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1. Introduction 
Understanding the causes of poverty and how to reduce it has been a major concern of 
developing countries. For many years, poverty reduction has attracted the attention of both 
governments and international development agencies. This literature review introduces and 
broadly discusses theories of the causes of poverty and approaches to poverty reduction. It 
then discusses decentralization and its intended contribution to poverty reduction.  
2.2. Concepts of poverty and decentralization 
2.2.1. Poverty 
2.2.1.1. Definition 
The concept of poverty has been controversial among academics and politicians. Poverty is 
characterized by not having enough income to satisfy basic needs and limiting the future of 
affected individuals by depriving them of the necessary tools for a better livelihood. Debates 
about poverty illuminate the absence of consensus on the definition of poverty. Some scholars 
have defined poverty in economic terms and argue that poverty is insufficient income for 
people to participate in the life of the society (National Research council, 1995:2) and to fulfill 
basic needs such as food, shelter, water and clothing (Hulme, Moore and Shepherd, 2001:6). 
Others such as Sen (1985), and World Bank (1990 and 2000) and United Nations development 
Programme (UNDP) (1990) recognize the relative importance of income but add to the 
definition the inability of an individual to access education and health services, their limited 
capability to obtain basic needs and low level of opportunities (voicelessness, powerlessness, 












(2001:8) notes that “relative deprivation in terms of incomes can yield absolute deprivation in 
terms of capabilities”.  
 In this view, two types of poverty can be distinguished. ‘Absolute poverty’ refers to the inability 
to satisfy minimum needs with regard to physical efficiency of a person (not enough food and 
poor health) (Deaton in Banerjee et al. Ed. 2006; Bonfiglioli, 2003), while ‘relative poverty’ 
implies the inability of an individual to actively participate in society (Deaton in Banerjee et al. 
Ed. 2006). This view has also led to a distinction between structural poverty or intergeneration 
poverty (i.e. the time spent in a poverty situation) and transitional poverty, which is a 
temporary situation affecting peoples’ ability to satisfy their needs (Hulme et al. 2001 and 
Bonfiglioli, 2003:13).  
Finding a suitable definition of poverty has dominated debates among economists, politicians 
and many others. Most of the definitions of poverty in the literature have been based on 
objective material evidence and have not taken into account the subjective perceptions of the 
poor. Being set by those who are not poor, these “objective” definitions of poverty are 
insufficient in that they do not consider the experiences of the poor. Those who may be 
considered as poor by the objective criteria may not accept being considered as poor although 
they would not refuse to take advantage of policies for poverty reduction. As argued by Alcock 
(1997:9), ignoring the “experiences of the poor people is likely to paint only a partial picture of 
the problem”.  
From the above discussion it is clear that the definition of poverty is determined by what is 
identified to be its cause. There is no consensus on the definition of, and what constitutes 












shortage of material, social and psychological goods (Alcock, 1997; Hulme et al. 2001). 
Divergent views on the definition of poverty elucidate how the concept of poverty has evolved 
over time and how actions have been identified to respond to the problem of poverty.  As is 
discussed in the next section, discussions among politicians and academics have consisted of 
the identification of the problem of poverty with the aim of finding a common action to fight 
against poverty.    
2.2.1.2. Evolution of the concept of poverty 
The concept of poverty has engendered controversial debate among scholars and policy 
makers. Though discussions of poverty are abundant in literature, there has never been 
consensus on the meaning of the concept. From the inception of these debates, poverty was 
related to low income. Nowadays the concept of poverty covers a broader number of aspects 
ranging from low income to denial of access to opportunities to satisfy basic needs. This means 
that poverty comprises a number of aspects ranging from not having “enough income to ensure 
being adequately fed, clothed or sheltered (income poverty) or being unhealthy (health 
poverty) as well as being denied access to education, political participation, or a full role in 
society” (Deaton in Banerjee et al. Ed. 2006). Poverty is also therefore said to be about power, 
voice and vulnerability. From this point of view, allocating each dimension of poverty a single 
and unique measurement tool can be justified. With particular attention paid to the various 
dimensions of poverty, one can distinguish income poverty from general or human poverty. It is 
in this vein that the World Bank’s definition of poverty in the 1990s has evolved from 
considering poverty as low income to including aspects such as access to education, health and 












and powerlessness  (Bonfiglioli, 2003). The shift from one meaning of poverty to another or 
adding more elements to its definition have led to the conclusion that poverty is not a 
descriptive but rather a prescriptive concept. Therefore, poverty is a political concept. Thus the 
understanding of poverty will reflect the actions expected to alleviate it. Poverty reduction is a 
rationale for policy action and changing views of poverty result from the policies formulated to 
address it (Alcock, 1997). It is nowadays accepted that, despite the importance of income in 
understanding poverty, poverty can be described as multidimensional (World Bank, 2000). This 
multi-dimensional view of poverty has permitted the inclusion of a range of deprivations as part 
of poverty definitions, such as voicelessness and powerlessness (Hulme et al. 2001). However 
the multi-dimensional definition of poverty raises some difficulties in measuring and comparing 
the different dimensions (Hulme et al. 2001 and World Bank, 2000).            
Given this concept of poverty, it is necessary to develop strategies that aim to improve the 
livelihood of people by increasing income, removing any constraints that may impede people’s 
productivity, and by offering the means for them to actively participate in different activities of 
society. This is only guaranteed when there are good institutions available in the country to 
support these strategies. It is in this context that the role of decentralization should be 
acknowledged. 
2.2.1.3. Dimensions of poverty 
If poverty has for many years been associated with low income and material deprivation, it is 
nowadays been identified as a multidimensional concept. Poverty is today understood not only 
in terms of low income or material deprivation but the concept includes other factors that are 












led to identification of different dimensions of poverty. These dimensions include income 
poverty and capabilities poverty (health and education, vulnerability, and voicelessness and 
powerlessness) which interact and reinforce each other. The World Bank (2001:15-20), in its 
World Development Report 2000/2001 identifies the following dimension of poverty:   
- Income poverty: this is a traditional way of identifying the poor. It is based on household 
income and expenditure using survey data as a source of information most of the time. It is 
a way of analyzing poverty quantitatively and provides a broad understanding of well-being. 
The poor are determined by setting up a poverty line based on a cut-off line in income or 
consumption.  
- Health and education: this dimension is used to refer to deprivation in health or education. 
It is widely accepted that productivity is associated with education and health. This is 
indicated by Deaton (2006) who argues that living in unsanitary environments and denied 
the opportunity to go to school constitute barriers to participate in activities which are open 
to healthy and literate people.  
- Vulnerability: this dimension refers to the fact that people are exposed to other factors that 
constitute a risk of falling into poverty. It is the risk households or individuals have of 
experiencing a problem of income or health poverty over time. Factors such as exposure to 
violence, crime and natural disasters and dropping out of school are more likely to deepen 
poverty. 
- Voicelessness and powerlessness: this dimension refers to the lack of opportunities offered 












reasons such as gender differences, religion, minority status, ethnic origin) to participate 
actively in society’s activities. 
2.2.1.4. Causes of poverty 
Interest in poverty reduction resulted in the identification of the causes of poverty and 
approaches to act in relation to it. Any approach to poverty reduction and its measurement is 
determined by the nature of causes of poverty. However, there is no consensus with regard to 
the interpretation of differences in income and standards of living between poor and rich 
countries and this has led to the identification of different causes of poverty. Literature on the 
causes of poverty is abundant and researchers have discussed them in a variety of manners. 
Causes of poverty are many and vary according to definitions of poverty. They also vary from 
country to country and region to region. However there are commonly agreed causes and they 
are discussed as follows: 
Geographic causes: these causes are related to the geographic position of a given country or 
region. A geographic dimension affecting prosperity and productivity is climate and relief. 
Climate can influence the presence of diseases which impact negatively on productivity. 
Geography can also determine the type of technology which is likely to be developed in a given 
region (Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson in Banerjee et al. Ed. 2006).  
Pathological causes: pathological causes are those related to the indolence and fecklessness of 
individuals, to genetic explanations such as those related to intelligence, and to explanation of 
individual achievements by reference to personality development (psychological). Poor 
parenting, low aspirations and disadvantaged family environment are root causes of poverty. 












Structural causes: Structural causes are those engendered by social changes. The changes in 
national and international economic forces can be a cause of poverty. Thus causes of poverty 
can originate from the socioeconomic structure existing in a given country. Social changes are 
therefore those which occur in political, institutional, family and community contexts. Poverty 
is a product of the interaction of these (Alcock, 1997). Among others these include:  
Institutional causes: These causes are considered by Acemoglu and others (2006) as the most 
fundamental causes of poverty. They have argued that the type of institutions inherited and 
shaped by colonialism explain the differences between rich and poor countries. In their 
research, they found that two types of institutions were inherited by the colonies: enabling 
institutions and extractive institutions. Countries that have inherited extractive institutions are 
those in which poverty prevails and at higher rate because these institutions do not guarantee 
the stability of the political and economic lives of the population. They do not put constraints 
upon the power of the elite in order to insure the development of better laws and institutions 
for the good of the society. Extractive institutions were established in countries where 
Europeans couldn’t settle because of diseases or high density of population. (Acemoglu, 
Johnson and Robinson in Banerjee et al. Ed. 2006). These countries are characterized by 
corruption and poor governance performance which hinder economic activities and result in 
increasing poverty (Saitoti, 2002, p. 71). These countries continue to suffer from the legacy of 
these institutions which developed during the colonial period. However in some other countries 
where Europeans settled in large numbers they developed institutions that put constraints 












Robinson, 2006). These institutions enhanced and facilitated development rather than being 
extractive as institutions have been in most developing countries.             
Macroeconomic stability: Instability in a country’s macroeconomic environment has a 
significant impact on the poor. Discussing the causes of poverty in Africa, Saitoti (2002) argues 
that long periods of macroeconomic instability, unmanageable public debt, hyperinflation, 
unemployment, volatile exchange rates, negative GDP growth and volatile interest result in low 
economic growth which impact negatively on development (Saitoti, 2002, p. 72). This instability 
affects the poor who are already suffering from their deprived situation. Any efforts made by 
the poor to get out of poverty are hindered by macroeconomic instability.      
Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP): the SAP is one of the external forces that affected 
social change in many developing countries. Although some of these countries have managed 
to benefit from the SAP, for many of them the cuts in expenditure, particularly on social welfare 
programmes have increased poverty. The SAP has been criticized by many scholars as having 
contributed to the deepening poverty and deteriorating of social services in countries 
participating in the programme. It is therefore regarded as one of the causes of poverty 
(Pedersen, Gibbon, Raikes, and Udsholt, 1996; Saitoti, 2002). 
Inequalities: enormous and pervasive  inequalities in accessing the means of production and 
political, economic and social goods, and gender based discrimination are also cited as 
contributing to pervasive poverty and retarding industrialization (Banerjee, Benabou, and 












Lack of technology: the inability to access needed technology for the exploitation of resources, 
and especially in agriculture is a major barrier to poverty reduction. As indicated by Saitoti 
(2002), this is caused by the persistence of dysfunctional institutions that not only did not 
support research to improve production methods but have hampered foreign investment flows. 
This state of affairs continues to perpetuate poverty among developing nations where the 
majority of the population is rural and agrarian.  
Population: most developing countries are characterized by a high population growth and low 
GDP. Households are bigger compared to those of developed countries. Having to care for a 
large number of children with limited resources may lead a family into deeper poverty (Saitoti, 
2002; Banerjee, Benabou, and Mookherjee, 2006).  
Civil and ethnic conflicts: civil and ethnic conflicts are also a cause of poverty. Civil and ethnic 
conflicts result not only in displacement of people from their properties but also result in the 
destruction of infrastructure and the disruption of economic activities (Saitoti, 2002). In a highly 
fragmented society it is difficult for the governments to get support from communities. It is 
difficult to undertake development projects in a turbulent environment (Miguel, Banerjee et al. 
Ed. 2006).                  
Ideological perspectives: identified causes of poverty can be related to ideological differences 
prevailing in a country. For countries where neoliberal ideas predominate, poverty is seen as a 
result of the intervention of the state in the economy. State intervention in assisting the poor 
encourages dependence and undermines the self-sufficiency of individuals. For conservatives 












state intervention needed in the economy. While conservatives seek minimal intervention, 
social democrats seek to interfere in the market. For revolutionary socialists poverty is the 
result of a punitive labour market resulting from capitalism (Alcock, 1997).  
2.2.2. Decentralization 
2.2.2.1. Definition  
Definitions of decentralization abound in the literature. It is defined, explained and interpreted 
with reference to the aspects of decentralization being studied. The wide variety of institutional 
arrangements and institutional reforms that decentralization encompasses makes it difficult to 
reach a consensual definition. For some scholars this implies autonomy in decision making, 
while for others it refers to democratic practices and territorial distribution of power; and for 
others it means bringing service closer to the local people. In general, decentralization refers to 
the transfer of power from the central government to local entities. This definition implies that 
decentralization is a complex process which can have various meanings according to the mode 
of power transfer, the nature of power transferred and the mode of appointment of local 
authorities. Therefore decentralization can have various forms. It can be administrative, 
political, fiscal or even economic and each of these forms can be studied separately. To quote 
the classical definition of Burki et al. (Burki et al, 1999 quoted in Sharma, 2006:53), 
decentralization may be defined as “the extent to which power is held by autonomous elected 
sub national governments capable of taking binding decisions in at least some policy areas”. In 
this definition only an entity with elected leaders invested with the authority of decision-












According to Turner and Hulme , decentralization is “a transfer of authority to perform services 
to the public from an individual or an agency in the central government to some other 
individual or agency which is ‘closer’ to the public to be served”, (1997:152). This definition 
focuses mainly on service delivery; the central government accepts the transfer of some of its 
authority to deliver public services and goods to the public. The aspect of electing is missing and 
the decision-making autonomy is not clear and undefined.  
To Rodinelli (1981) decentralization should be understood as the process by which the 
authority to plan, make decisions and manage public functions is transferred from a higher level 
of the government to any individual, organization or agency at local level. While to Smith (1985: 
1), decentralization is “reversing the concentration of the administration at a single center and 
conferring powers on local government”.   
From these definitions it can be concluded that decentralization is a transfer of power (political, 
managerial and legal), a transfer of capacities (financial, logistical and human resources) from 
the central government to local government and the people in order to insure rational 
management of available resources at local level and provide better service delivery to local 
people.   
2.2.2.2. Forms of decentralization 
Scholars, organizations and policymakers discuss decentralization differently depending on the 
objectives and functions to be assigned to decentralized units. The fact that there is no 
consensus about the definition of decentralization shows how multifaceted the concept is and 
how it can appear in different forms. Cohen and Peterson (1999) have identified six approaches 












service delivery, objective based and single country based approach). Likewise Triesman (2000) 
have identified five types of political decentralization: structural decentralization, decision 
decentralization, resource decentralization, electoral decentralization and institutional 
decentralization.  
Rodinelli and Nellis and Rondinelli and Cheema (1983) have identified four forms of 
decentralization: deconcentration, devolution, delegation and privatization. These forms are 
the forms of decentralization most often used. I focus on these in the next subsection.  
2.2.2.2.1. Deconcentration 
This form of decentralization refers to a dispersion of some administrative responsibilities from 
a central government service to a level nearer to the people but without a transfer of authority 
to lower levels of government. Local level service providers execute instructions from the 
center, they do not allow any authority to make decisions or exercise discretion in executing 
their responsibilities. This form of decentralization does not give decision making power either 
to service providers or to recipients, all decisions are taken at the central level.  
2.2.2.2.2. Delegation 
Delegation is a form of decentralization through which the central government decides to 
transfer some of its authority to local government or semi-autonomous organizations with 
administrative and technical capabilities to carry out delegated powers. This occurs when the 
central government is overloaded with work, or when there is an increase in the importance 
and urgency of services. It may therefore be defined as, to quote Rondinelli and Cheema 












concerning specific activities - or a variety of activities within spatial boundaries - to an 
organization that is technically and administratively capable of carrying them out without direct 
supervision by a bigger administrative unit”, (21).   
2.2.2.2.3. Devolution 
Devolution refers to a situation in which central government transfers authority for decision 
making, finance and management to autonomous entities at local level. Decentralized units 
hold political and managerial power and are legally mandated to manage their territories. In 
this form of decentralization the central government has a limited control over local 
governments and the latter are invested with power to manage resources and have reciprocal 
interactions within local structures and with other government units. This form of 
decentralization is thought assist people to have confidence in their leaders and have a feeling 
of ownership with regard to decisions made.  
2.2.2.2.4. Privatization      
Privatization is a form of decentralization in which public functions and institutions are 
transferred to private organizations, companies or firms. This occurs when the government has 
inability to deliver specific services because of managerial problems. In such cases the 
government decides to give the services to independent organizations which include the 
private sector (local or international firms or companies), civil society or voluntary 
organizations. 












Fiscal decentralization refers to a situation in which the central government transfers fiscal 
responsibilities to lower levels of government in order to influence budgetary and financial 
decisions.  
Each form of decentralization can be observed at least somewhere and each has particular 
implication in terms of impacting on both the effective responsiveness and the lives of local 
people and in particular on poverty. The form which is more likely to yield more positive 
outcomes in terms of responsiveness and livelihood is devolution (political decentralization). 
Devolution has the advantage of not only granting political and managerial autonomy but also 
granting the financial means to allow local governments to pursue and achieve their task. 
However, beyond positive technical feasibility and theoretical expectations the success of 
devolution is based on the political will from the centre which exists to allow decentralized 
units to execute their duties effectively.  
2.3. Approaches to poverty reduction 
2.3.1. Non institutional approach 
Poverty reduction and economic growth  
Since the 1950s, the incidence of poverty reduction has been measured by taking into account 
the economic growth rate. In the 1980s and 1990s, the rate of economic growth became a 
powerful tool to measure poverty reduction across countries, particularly with regard to the 
measurement of income poverty (World Bank, 2001). Economic growth determined by an 
increase in average income and consumption has been long associated with poverty reduction. 












context, the level of poverty reduction would depend on the increased level of economic 
growth. However, the impact of economic growth depends on how income is distributed 
among the population (Deaton in Banerjee et al. Ed. 2006) and the size of the current economy. 
If the assumption regarding the influence of economic growth on poverty reduction were true, 
then all countries with similar economic growth rates would have similar poverty reduction 
rates. Unfortunately, various results across countries have been observed (World Bank, 2000). 
To understand these differences it is necessary to consider the environment and opportunities 
that have been driving growth. As is argued by Deaton (2006), when growth generates 
increased opportunities such as access to schools and health, this is more likely to benefit the 
majority of the people, but when growth occurs in a society which denies some people 
opportunities to participate in these activities, growth is more likely to benefit the group of 
people who have access to opportunities. In the same vein, the World Bank (2001:52) makes 
the point that “differences in inequality at a given rate of growth could reflect the fact that the 
combination of policies and institutions that led to this growth differed across countries”.   
 These assumptions about economic growth and poverty have been criticized by many scholars. 
The major and common critique is that economic growth supporters do not consider factors 
which drive growth (World Bank, 2001). Nelson (2005:1) states that economic growth simplifies 
reality and it ignores “a wide range of other institutions that have played key roles, like 
universities and public laboratories, scientific and other professional associations and 
government agencies and programmes”. From this point of view, economic growth is nowadays 












low income, but is also about capabilities (Deaton in Banerjee et al. Ed. 20062006, World Bank, 
2001, Saitoti, 2002). 
Until the late 1960s, modernization9 was a dominating dynamic of poverty reduction programs 
in most developing countries. It was thought that development and poverty reduction in these 
countries would occur and accelerate only if they industrialized, urbanized, and broadened 
access to education and access to the mass media. These would transform the structure of 
societies from rural to industrial, from agricultural production to heavy manufacturing, from 
work on farms to employment in factories and from peasants to workers (see Inglehart, 1997; 
Dube, 1988; Bill and Hardgrave, 1981; Inglehart and Baker, 2000: 19-22; Norris, 2002:20-25; 
Kuhnen, 1986-1987:1; Wignaraja and Sirivardana, 2004:51; Engberg-Pedersen et al., 1996:5). 
The principal role was to be played by the government through state investment in physical 
capital and infrastructure (Bonfiglioli, 2003, p. 14).   
However, the persistence of poverty led to a criticism of modernization and, in the 1960s its 
assumptions were rejected by dependency theorists10. They argued that poverty reduction in 
                                                           
9
 Modernization theory assumed that the development enjoyed by Western countries would occur in the same manner in the 
developing world. Modernization scholars argued that development is normative and though all people are not equal they are 
however ruled by the same economic rules and have followed the same historical path. They believed there are steps for 
success, a development pattern to be considered for any country to become prosperous and develop a modern economy which 
in turn will enrich the lives of the country’s citizens. (See the works of the master of the theory Walt W. Rostow, The process of 
Economic Growth (1952) and, The Stages of Economic Growth (1960). High levels of industrialization, urbanization, education 
and communication were thought to imply social and political advancement. Developing countries embraced this approach 
before and after independence. Their primary concern was to transform their societies from predominantly rural societies into 
urban societies and change agricultural economies into industrial and technology economies, with the assistance of Western 
Countries. This was thought to increase a country’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP), which in turn would increase wealth and 
reduce poverty. Modernization theorists assume that poverty eradication and good governance are independent from each 
other. Development and poverty reduction were conceived and explained exclusively in economic terms, based on 
deterministic models. This theory inspired many political economists in explaining political development.
 
10
 Dependency theory was advocated in the 1950s by the former Director of the United Nations’ Economic Commission for Latin 
America, Raul Prebisch and his colleagues who were troubled by the fact that economic growth in industrialized countries 
coincided with a decrease in wealth in developing countries. Dependency theorists rejected the modernization argument, 
arguing that the backwardness and stagnation of the third world was due to their position as dependent entities in the world 
trading system and as an outcome unequal development occurred within regions. The theory held that poor countries would 
never be able to address the problem of poverty because they export raw material at low prices and import manufactured 












developing nations was hindered by the terms of international trade and investment, whereby 
resources flow from a periphery of poor countries to a core of wealthy countries, with little 
positive outcomes for peripheral countries. They suggested that to help developing countries 
end their dependency it was necessary to restructure international term of trade (see Raffer, 
1987; Tausch, 2003; Dos Santos, 1971; A.G. Frank, 1972).   
Other social scientists (see for example Lewis, 1969: 190-192) went beyond economic 
explanations, and emphasized the impact of culture on poverty. Cultural sociologists attempted 
to show that poverty and inequality are outcomes of cultural factors. They used cultural factors 
to explain how poor individuals deal with their circumstances of poverty. Poverty was explained 
by them with regard to endogenous factors, but cultural values and behavior emerging from 
poverty situations was seen to result in what Lewis called a “culture of poverty”. The culture of 
poverty11 theory held that poverty is perpetuated by cultural values and behavior and not only 
by economic conditions. A culture of poverty was seen as characterized by strong feelings of 
marginalization, helplessness, dependency, and the belief that the interests of the poor are not 
taken into account by existing institutions. People living in a culture of poverty were thought to 
develop an inferiority complex and feelings of personal unworthiness and they were thought to 
have little sense of history. They were seen as only having knowledge of their own troubles, 
                                                                                                                                                                             
resources and labour. The peripheral position hold by developing nations in the international division of labor was seen to 
perpetuate poverty in these nations. This relationship of dependency was seen to advantage political elites in the periphery 
while deepening the poverty of their citizens and is seen as capitalist imperialism.  
11
 The culture of poverty can be shaped and sustained by neighborhoods (Small, 2004 and Harding, 2005), by cultural practices, 
beliefs and attitudes (Swidler, 1986; Wilson, 1996; Lamont, 1992), stories or narratives (Bertaux, 1984; Somers, 1994, 
Abelmann, 2003; Ewick and Sibey, 2003; Young, 2004), by symbolic boundaries and identities (Lamont, 2000); Lamont and 
Therenot ,2000; Gallie and Paugham, 2000; Katz, 1989; Silver, 1993), by high status cultural signals (Lamont and Small, 2006) 
and by institutional channels (Hall and Taylor, 1996; Meyer and Rowan, 1991). Payne (2005:47) differentiates generational 
poverty, which implies a situation in which people have been in poverty for at least two generations, from situational poverty 
which she defines as a lack of resources due to a particular event. The theory of a culture of poverty was criticized by many 
scholars who argued that the use of a culture of poverty explanation is simply a way of portraying the poor (Eleanor Burke 












local conditions, their own neighborhood and their own way of life. They were assumed to live 
and believe in their own world (see Lewis, 1969; Payne, 2005; Lamont and Small, 2006). The 
culture of poverty was seen as the root cause of what Payne called the “cycle of poverty”. 
Poverty and underdevelopment were seen as persistent in most developing countries, 
particularly in Africa, as a result of traditional and cultural factors (Welch, in Spiro. Ed., 1967:80-
89). Putnam (1993), comparing the Northern and Southern regions of Italy, noted that cultural 
values could be incentives or disincentives to economic and institutional performance. He 
concluded that differences in economic performance between the two regions could be 
explained by different cultural values.  
2.3.2. Institutional approach 
The persistence of poverty in many developing countries has recently convinced scholars to 
investigate the role and importance of institutions in the process of development and poverty 
reduction. Institutions12 are defined as a set of rules that shape and structure human 
interactions, whether political, social or economic, in a society (North, 1990:3). The institutional 
approach is that poverty reduction policies based on economic growth are not sufficient to 
influence poverty reduction because they are themselves shaped by social, political and 
institutional processes. These theorists see institutions as  important because they improve 
economic performance, they are enabling entities, they create the environment in which the 
various actors in society operate, they reduce cost and risk transactions, they encourage (create 
a safeguard for) investments, they enhance equal redistribution and transfer of resources, 
provide public goods where the market has failed and they sustain social stability (see North, 
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 Institutions can be formal or informal. In the context of this study, institutions refer to political institutions, particularly 












1990; Bates in Harris et al. Ed., 1995; Toye in Harris et al. Ed 1995,:61-64; Jonhston in L. 
Wohlgemuth, J. Carlsson, and H. Kifle. Ed., 1998; Tomlinson, in Harris et al. Ed., 1995; Nelson, 
2005; Khan, in Harris et al. Ed. 1995; Fukuyama, 2007 in Dinello and Popov. Ed., 21-24; Putnam, 
1993; Soskice et al., 1992; Dinello and Popov. Ed., 2007:3-15; Bates, 2006; Dzorgbo, 2001:308).  
Institutions can support the effectiveness of decisions and the efficient use of available 
resources (Dinello and Popov. Ed., 2007:1). They can shape the behavior of individuals to 
ensure their participation in development (Jumbe and Angelsen, in Dinello and Popov. Ed., 
2007: 171). Institutions can create or restrict political and economic opportunities and structure 
incentives in human exchanges, whether political, social or economic (North, 1990). By 
determining the distribution of opportunities and political power within the society, political 
institutions impact on the structure and performance of economic institutions. Therefore they 
can play a key role in development and poverty reduction. 
The institutional approach considers that the poor quality and limited capacity of state 
institutions are the underlying causes of poverty in developing countries. North (1990:9) argued 
that poverty in developing countries is caused by the existence of institutional constraints 
which define a set of payoffs for political and economic activities that do not encourage 
productive activities. Developing countries, as argued by Israel (1987), lack the required 
institutions that have the ability to influence the effective use and rational allocation of 
available resources. Accordingly this approach maintains that differences in economic growth 
between societies should be studied by taking into consideration institutions prevailing within 












Dube (1988:25) also noted that the lack of an adequate institutional base has condemned 
modernization and poverty reduction strategies to failure in developing countries. 
The role of state institutions in combating poverty is also highlighted in the 2000-2001 World 
Development Report. The report suggests that poverty is an outcome not only of economic 
processes but of interacting economic, social, and political forces. In particular, it is seen as an 
outcome of the accountability and responsiveness of state institutions (Skocpol, 1992; Bates, 
1989; North, 1990; quoted by World Bank, 2001:99). Osmani (_:3) notes that without an 
appropriate governance structure, developing countries will not be able to generate either 
sustainable economic growth or a momentum towards poverty reduction. 
Thus, this theory maintains that the poor quality of institutions can hinder the implementation 
of development progammes. Institutional arrangements either increase or decrease 
productivity. For institutions to impact positively on development, institutional change is 
required. Institutional development can be achieved through institutional reform13. 
Decentralization emerges as a type of institutional reform that can insure that societies benefit 
from the political and economic opportunities embodied in state institutions. The recognition of 
the role of institutions in shaping development has convinced the governments of many 
developing countries to decentralize political, fiscal and administrative institutions. 
Historically many developing countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America had highly centralized 
governments and leaders who undervalued the role and importance of local government in 
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 Here reform refers to the way political power is redistributed within societies to ensure inclusiveness and equal access to 
opportunities for the improvement of wellbeing and poverty reduction. However, in most developing countries, and African 
countries in particular, reforms and particularly those suggested by Structural Adjustment Programmes have been difficult to 
implement because of the persistence of politics based on patrimonialism. For more detail see Goetz (2007), R. G. Rajan (2007) 













national development. Newly independent states in Africa and Asia considered decentralization 
as a threat to national unity. By the late 1970s and 1980s, however, the recognition of the role 
and importance of local entities in development encouraged governments to decentralize.  
In recent years many developing countries have attempted to decentralize institutions of 
governance (Fukasaku and de Mello, 1999; Manor, 1999; World Bank, 1999; Shah, 1998; Crook 
and Manor, 1998; Futardo, 2001). The poor results of centralized economic planning convinced 
these countries to turn to decentralization in order to limit central government and focus on 
broader participation in democratic governance (Olowu, 2000; UN-OHRLLS and UNDP, 2006; 
Smoke, 1994; Wunsch and Olowu, 1990; Futardo, 2001). Being closer to and interacting with 
people, it was assumed that local authorities could more easily identify and prioritize people’s 
needs, and thus apply more appropriate solutions to address them (Enemuo, 2000; Rondinelli 
et al., 1989; Oates, 1972). Decentralized government structures enable participation of local 
communities not only in the management of local resources but also in decision-making and 
support collaboration between public agencies and local communities (Johnson, 2001).  
It was also argued that local communities would more readily pay taxes to local governments 
and the contributed amounts could be more directly related to services received through 
decentralized government structures (Livingstone and Charlton, 1998; Westergaard and Alam, 
1995). By bringing public services closer to people decentralization was also said to enhance 
accountability and reduce the amount of discretion available to bureaucrats, and thus 
contribute to transparent governance (Quentin L. Quade, 1993: 186-187; Bardhan and 












1999:187; Ashley and Maxwell, 2001; World Bank 2000; UN-OHLLS and UNDP, 2006). By 
enhancing participation, decentralization supports the creativity, awareness and efficiency of 
poor and marginalized groups whose input is necessary for poverty reduction (Wignaraja and 
Sirivardana, 2004). Rural development scholars believe as well that decentralization could 
reduce political and economic imbalances between rural and urban areas (Tőtomeyer, 
1999:187; Parker, 1995; Ashley and Maxwell, 2001:418). Decentralization was also seen as 
supporting the transfer of skills to decentralized entities (Parker, 1995). It allows broad 
consensus and support for policies from all interest groups (Sopchokchai, 2003). 
However, many scholars have argued that there is no clear positive link between poverty 
reduction and decentralization14, but suggest that decentralization remains a means to poverty 
reduction, not an end in itself for development problems (Bossuyt and Gould, 2000:8; Von Baun 
and Grote, 2000:2, Dethier 2004:23). Decentralization can affect poverty directly (when it 
relates to regionally targeted transfers) or indirectly (as a means of promoting efficiency in 
public services) (Von Baun and Grote, 2000:2). Evidence from India, the Philippines, Nepal, Sri-
Lanka, Thailand, China and Bolivia show that decentralization has made local government more 
accountable to the people and improved the livelihoods of local citizens, in particular those 
living in rural areas15. Considering this, one would expect to see the implementation of the 
decentralization policy in Rwanda yielding positive results in poverty reduction.  
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 The poor link between decentralization and poverty reduction is in part explained by the fact that a government policy 
statement does not emphasize a link between decentralization and poverty reduction via strategies of empowerment and 
resource mobilization. It is further explained by the fact that in most countries national decentralization policies do not provide 
local government with the mandate to effectively combat poverty (for details see Bossuyt & Gould. October 2000).  
15
 For example, in India the Bhoomi program, the BATF (Bangalore Agenda Task Force) and DWRCA (Development of Women 












However, the positive impact of decentralization on poverty reduction depends not only on 
factors such as the political will of governments, the extent of autonomy and responsibilities 
devolved to local governments, the availability of resources,  and capacity of decentralized 
governments to respond to exigencies of poverty reduction. Positive results also depend on the 
monitoring and inspection mechanisms and information systems available with regard to 
decentralized institutions (Von Braun and Grote; 2000, UN-DESA, 2003; Fukuyama, 2004; 
Futardo, 2001; Goetz, 2007: 419).      
Though there is evidence with regard to the impact of decentralization on poverty reduction, 
decentralized entities in many African countries are still subordinated to central government16. 
As a result there has been little positive impact on poverty reduction because local 
governments are not empowered and both a centralized technocratic system and a system of 
local patronage have been created in the decentralization process. This impedes the 
participation of local people and their access to the benefits of decentralization, particularly 
those related to development (UN-OHRLLS and UNDP, 2006:57-59) prevailing.  
For decentralization to yield positive results, a transfer of resources is a prerequisite in addition 
to a transfer of political authority. Resources are indispensable for decentralized entities to 
fulfill their responsibilities at local level and in order for them to play a role in poverty 
reduction. The following chapter discusses the methodology used to assess the linkage 
between decentralization and poverty reduction in Rwanda.  
                                                                                                                                                                             
and reduced corruption. Moreover in China and India decentralization has encouraged competition in reforming local 
governments in order to attract investment (see Manor, 2007; Goetz, 2007). 
16
 Uganda has been identified among others as an example where the subordination of decentralized entities prevails. See UN-












CHAPTER 3. RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY  
The period covered in this analysis is 2001 to 2006, corresponding to the period when Rwanda’s 
decentralization policy was implemented. In this research, data on poverty collected before the 
period 2001 will be compared to those collected after the decentralization policies were 
implemented. If decentralization has reduced poverty, it should then be true that where 
decentralization was implemented most extensively, there should be greater poverty reduction. 
The unit of analysis is the district. To determine the impact of decentralization on poverty, this 
study will focus first on district income and expenditure per capita, the infrastructure (schools, 
health centers, water supply, and roads) built since 2001, and capabilities of the staff in each 
district. Secondly, the research will focus on participation of the population and local 
organizations in decision making processes and the execution of development programmes for 
poverty reduction.  
3.1. Measurement 
Poverty reduction also did not occur at the same level across the entire country: there was 
variation across provinces and districts. To test whether decentralization in Rwanda has actually 
reduced poverty, measurement will be based on district income data, citizen participation, 
resource mobilization, institutional capacity and development investment (infrastructures built 
from 2001 and 2006).  












1. The poverty reduction level is measured by subtracting, for each district, the poverty 
incidence in 2000/2001 (EICV1) from that of 2005-2006 (EICV2). Poverty incidence is 
measured by consumption expenditure from EICV 2000/2001 and EICV2 2005/2006.    
Independent variables: 
2. Resource mobilization: the level of resource mobilization will be measured, for each 
district, by local tax income and funds received from the central government. This will 
allow the calculation of income per capita for each district. This is crucial for the study 
because limited financial capabilities can undermine local government responsiveness 
and thus have a negative impact on poverty reduction.  
3. Participation: the level of participation will be measured by the voting turnout, in each 
district, in local elections and the number of cooperatives in each district.  
4. Institutional capacity: institutional capacity will be measured by the competence of local 
staff (the percentage of key officials and percentage of officials with a university degree) 
in each district.  
5. Development investment: development investment will be measured by comparing 
variations in development infrastructure built since 2001 and by comparing expenses on 
infrastructure projects (district expenditure per capita on education, health, water and 
roads). 
6. Simple recovery from the 1994 holocaust: simple recovery will be measured using 













3.2. Data collection 
To measure each of these variables, I have collected the following types of data:  
1. To measure local government income, I have collected the financial report on income 
mobilized (taxes) and expenditure for each of the 30 districts.  
2. To measure poverty change, I used the EICV 2000/2001 and EICV 2005/2006 surveys.    
3. To measure participation: data on voter turnout, I have obtained from the National 
Electoral Commission and data on the number of cooperatives have been obtained from 
Rwanda Cooperative Agency (Ministry of commerce).  
4. To measure the impact of infrastructure on poverty reduction, I have collected two 
types of data:   
a) District expenditure per capita on education, health, water and roads, obtained from 
the district budget and CDF (Common Development Fund) data.  
b) Availability of schools, clinics and difference in percentage of households with access 
to safe water are from EICV1 and EICV2  
5. To measure the damage of genocide, I have obtained data on widows and orphans of 
the genocide from the 2007 survey undertaken by the National Institute of Statistics. 
The next chapter discusses decentralization in Rwanda and presents data used to explore the 
















CHAPTER 4. DECENTRALIZATION IN RWANDA 
4.1. Introduction 
The adoption of a decentralization policy marked the commitment of the Government of 
Rwanda to deepening democratization by placing people at the center of the fight against 
poverty. This was coupled with the belief in the importance of effective governance institutions 
in influencing the development and wellbeing of citizens. This implies that the government of 
Rwanda has realized the important influence of institutions of governance over the political, 
economic and social future of Rwandan society. It is now widely accepted that good governance 
is a prerequisite for poverty reduction and development. It also implies that Rwandans are 
expecting not only to enjoy the potential benefits of decentralization but also will be able to 
participate and contribute to the implementation of poverty reduction programmes. 
The new approach marked a sharp break with the belief in strong central government which 
had dominated the country throughout the colonial period and after independence. Two major 
reasons may have motivated central government to decentralize. Firstly, decentralization can 
be motivated by the need for improvement in the efficiency of service delivery. Here, the idea 
is that better knowledge of local conditions and situations would lead to the implementation of 
“policies and programs that reflect people’s real need and preference” (Jütting et al., 2004:8). 
This results in efficient allocation of scarce resources. Secondly, decentralization can be 
motivated by the need for improving governance. Decentralization is, in this context, seen as a 
tool for enabling accountability, eliminating patrimonialism by “creating institutional 












al., 2004:9). Thus, local governments in Rwanda have the mission of ensuring that democracy is 
fostered at local level, promoting socioeconomic development at local level and supporting the 
solidarity of local communities in their development efforts. This chapter discusses the 
Rwandan decentralization policy and its implementation. It also describes data on key variables 
that will be used in exploring the link between decentralization and poverty reduction in 
Rwanda.  
4.2. Policy of decentralization  
4.2.1. Overview of decentralization policy 
After many years of central management of public affairs, Rwanda’s center realized that the 
expected socioeconomic and political development had not taken place. The policy of 
decentralization emerged as an alternative to its inefficient and highly centralized system. The 
adoption of the policy of decentralization on 26 May 2000 marked a clear commitment of the 
Government of Rwanda to embark on the path of transforming society by devolving authority, 
autonomy and responsibilities to local communities. This was to be done by decentralizing 
management and reminding local people to take their destiny in their hands. The policy is 
based on the belief that fostering democratization at local level is a means to overcome the 
country’s political, economic and social crisis and, initiating the development. 
If current laws on decentralization in Rwanda have marked an important step towards 
devolution, these laws are however not the first of their kind. For example in 1962, the colonial 
government organized and created decentralized local entities, named “communes”. The major 












“whereby the appointee chiefs and leaders are replaced by democratically elected 
representatives (Ndahimana et al, 2002:9)”. This ensures that local communities have a say in 
choosing their leaders. Another aspect that has been brought in is the principal of “shared 
responsibility” between leaders and local communities. This is implying a greater involvement 
of local communities in the management of the district and other entities at local level.    
After the 1994 genocide, the then Government of the National Unity engaged in the process of  
setting up institutional arrangements to enable participation of all layers of the Rwandan nation 
in social, political and economic rebuilding and consolidating the development of the country. 
They held national and local level meetings to consult on governance issues, between May 
1998 and March 1999. The broad national consultation resulted in the adoption of the National 
Decentralization Policy on 26th May, 2000. Also, the choice of decentralization made by the 
Government of Rwanda aimed at materializing “the peoples’ exercise of power over their 
leaders at central and local levels” (Republic of Rwanda, 2000:8)17. The Government shared the 
same view with many scholars (Jütting, 2004, Braum and Groot, 2000, Maddick, 1963) and 
donors that democratic decentralization is a tool to enable local communities to engage in 
development activities to insure a sustainable development. This policy was actually 
implemented in March 2001, when the first district level elections were held. However, these 
elections were preceded by elections at cell and sector level held in 1999 (see Ndahimana et al, 
2002:22, Republic of Rwanda, 2000). Its implementation was preceded by laws, regulations and 
guidelines to ensure better functioning of local governments. The Government of Rwanda 
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 This principle was, at the time of the adoption of the decentralization policy, enacted in Title 1, article 6 of the 
1991 Constitution of the Republic of Rwanda, and it has been reiterated in Chapter1, article 2 of the current 












adopted decentralization as a system of governance that would allow the country to engage all 
people in the process of combating poverty. 
4.2.2. Objectives of decentralization in Rwanda 
The decentralization policy aimed to ensure “political, economic, social, managerial and 
technical empowerment of local communities to fight poverty by participating in planning and 
management of their development” (see Republic of Rwanda: 2000). To attain this, strategic 
objectives were set out as follows:   
• Enable and reactivate local people to participate in initiating, making, implementing and 
monitoring decisions and plans that concern them taking into consideration their local 
needs, priorities, capacities and resources from central to local government and lower 
levels. 
• Strengthen accountability and transparency in Rwanda by making local leaders directly 
accountable to the communities they serve and by establishing a clear linkage between 
the taxes people pay and the services that are financed by these taxes. 
• Enhance the sensitivity and responsiveness of public administration to the local 
environment by placing the planning, financing, management and control of service 
provision at the point where services are provided, and by enabling local leadership to 
develop organizational structures and capabilities that take into consideration the local 
environment and needs. 
• Enhance effectiveness and efficiency in the planning, monitoring and delivery of services 
by reducing the burden from central government officials who are distanced from the 












• Develop sustainable economic planning and management capacity at local levels that 
will serve as the driving engine for planning, mobilization and implementation of social, 
political and economic development to alleviate poverty (Republic of Rwanda, 2000:9-
10). 
4.2.3. Implementation of the policy of decentralization 
The adoption of decentralization policy, however does not guarantee that Rwanda actually has 
a decentralized system. To ensure that the will expressed in the policy is translated into action 
there should be active implementation18. To ensure the materialization of the decentralization 
policy, the following phases were taken:  
The first phase refers to preparation, sensitization and consultation. The aim of this phase was 
to develop a sense of democratization, develop a culture of participation of the population 
including civil society and the private sector, reconciling and stabilizing the society and 
enhancing transparent and accountable management systems. To achieve this aim, seminars, 
field visits by the minister and staff, and study visits in other countries have been organized on 
one hand and at the same time an intensive sensitization consultation of the population has 
been carried out on the other hand. This phase started in 1997 and ended in 1999. In 1999, a 
specific ministry dedicated to local government was created with the special mandate of 
implementing the decentralization policy. This was the outcome of the first phase. 
The second phase has been marked by the materialization of the recommendations of the first 
phase. Here, actions involving preparation, approval of a legal and regulatory framework, 
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 This is the reason why Rwanda’s decentralization policy is framed in four major policy documents: 
Decentralization policy (2000), Implementation Strategy for Decentralization Policy (2000), Fiscal and Financial 












staffing and organizing elections for the implementation of political and administrative 
decentralization were undertaken. Also, supporting institutions such as the National 
Transformation Steering Committee (NTSC) and Decentralization Management Unit (DMU), 
Rwandan Association of Local Government Authorities (RALGA) were created. 
The third phase is associated with preparatory works in identifying means by which districts 
would mobilize resources and determine different financial sources for district development. At 
this level, the legal provisions for districts to levy and collect taxes are of great importance 
because districts need the financial means to carry out development programs and ensure 
better service delivery to local communities. 
The fourth phase is related to service delivery and deconcentration of some ministry lines, 
which are routine activities for provinces in order to ensure that social services are closer to 
people. 
The last phase is related to a more devolution of responsibilities to district and the 
consolidation of what has been achieved in the previous phases. (see Bonfiglioli, 2003:20; 
Ndahimana et al, 2002). 
Figure 2 below, depicts the implementation process of decentralization policy and distribution 















Figure 2: Rwanda’s decentralization implementation process 
 
 
Source: MINALOC Minister’s presentation to the Cabinet on Administrative Reform, 7
th
 Dec 2005 
Figure 2 above displays how decentralization has increased the responsibility of local layers by 
relocating political and managerial powers from the center to local entities. The diamond is 
wide where more power of decision making is concentrated. In 2000 no powers were held by 
local government “layers” and all decisions were taken and implemented by central 
government. Between the central and local government there were also a number of layers. 
But since 2001, decentralization has responded to this challenge and more power has been 
devolved to local entities. As years pass by and as decentralization structures mature, more 
power is devolved to local government.  
Aside from the devolution of power, implementation of decentralization has led to 
administrative reform. The implementation of decentralization is occurring on an incremental 
process. As the Figure 2 shows, in 2006 more political and managerial powers were 












In order to meet responsibilities and resources for better service delivery, the number of 
government layers between local and central government has also been reduced. This allows 
the addition of unplanned elements and reduction of administrative layers to ensure that more 
power is devolved to levels closer to local communities. It is in this regard that for each phase 
of decentralization, territorial division has been undertaken and in particular with the aim of 
responding to the challenge of limited capacities in human and finance resources that are likely 
to impede the process. Table 1 below shows how territorial division has been done since the 
inception of the policy of decentralization. Prior to the implementation of decentralization, 
Rwanda had 12 prefectures, 22 sub-prefectures, 154 communes, 1544 sectors and 9104 cells. 
These were reduced to 5 provinces, 30 districts, 416 sectors and 2148 cells by 2006. The 
purpose of reducing the number of local entities was to enable an increase of financial 
capabilities and human resources at local government level.  
Table 1: Territorial division layers 
Before 2001 Between 2001 and 2005 Since 2006 
Entities 
Chief 
administrator Number Entities 
Chief 
administrator Number Entities 
Chief 
administrator Number 
Prefecture Prefet 12 
Province/










Commune Burgomaster 154 
District/ 
Town Mayor 106 Districts Mayor 30 
Sector Councilor 1544 Sector Coordinator 1550 Sector 
Executive 
secretary 416 
Cell Chief of cell 9104 Cell Coordinator 9219 Cell Coordinator 2148 
Source: Ndahimana et al, 2002 and UNDP, 2007. 
Rwanda is divided into provinces, districts, sectors and cells (see table 1). In October 2006 












The country is composed of 5 provinces which are the Northern Province, the Southern 
Province, the Western Province, the Eastern Province and the City of Kigali. Provinces are 
deconcentrated entities governed by a Governor appointed by the cabinet. The role of the 
province is to coordinate district activities and ensure that all activities at district level are 
executed in accordance with national policies. The City of Kigali has however a particular status 
which makes it a decentralized province and its leaders are not appointed but are rather 
elected. In Rwanda, provinces are not included in the category of local government. Each 
Province is subdivided into districts which are the local governments. (Republic of Rwanda, 
2006: iii, 2; Republic of Rwanda, 2007:9). 
4.2.4. Competences of local government  
In Rwanda, local governments have the competence to deliver services to local communities, 
through coordinating and implement development programs which take into account the 
wishes of their local communities. They also have the competence to maintain existing 
infrastructure in their areas. For a better success in caring out devolved responsibilities, the 
combination of administrative, political and fiscal decentralization is envisaged by the 
Government of Rwanda. These three forms of decentralization are discussed in the subsections 
below.  
4.2.4.1. Administrative decentralization  
To ensure that decentralized entities operate well, the Government of Rwanda clearly defined 
the role of the central government and that of decentralized entities (provinces as 












government has been limited to formulation of national policies about education, national 
security, foreign policy, international trade, industrial licensing, money, banking and national 
finance, prevention and control of natural calamities, construction and maintenance of national 
infrastructure, national education and culture, conservation and environmental protection 
policy, national health policy, exploitation of natural resources policy (Republic of Rwanda, 
2000). On the other hand, the role of local governments is to ensure that the participative 
process in local development is effective and operational as outlined in section 3.2.4 above.  
Local government and decision-making autonomy: A certain degree of autonomy in decision 
making is needed in order to enhance local government authorities’ ability to act and 
implement programmes for better satisfaction of the needs of local communities. The extent of 
their autonomy is determined by how responsibilities are distributed between the central 
government and the local governments. The autonomy informs how the process of decision 
making operates and the impact of local government on poverty reduction.  
In Rwanda, local governments have autonomy in decision making, in particular those decisions 
related to development. Their decisions must be in coherence with the overall national policy 
and constitution. However, district council decisions are subject to prior approval of the 
provincial authority (Governor), who’s requested to object to decision within seven working 
days. Failing to do so, the Executive Committee of the district will implement the decision19.    
In Rwanda, decision making power at local government level is dispersed between three 
organs, namely: the District Council, the Executive Committee, and Security Committee.  
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Comparing the rate of decentralization in Rwanda with that of other African countries, Rwanda 
is in the group of countries that has a score of between 2.5 and 3; the actual score for rwanda 
BEING 2.720, where the highest score is 4. It comes after South Africa and Uganda and has the 
same score as Nigeria, Tanzania and Zimbabwe (see Figure 3 below).   
Figure 3: Extent of administrative decentralization in Rwanda compared to 30 other 
   African countries 
 
 
Source: Ndegwa (2002:4). 
The capacity of institutions to undertake their functions is a requirement for combating 
poverty. Sufficient management capabilities are required for local governments to attain the 
objective of reducing poverty in Rwanda. Here, the emphasis is on the human resources 
available in the administration of local government to fulfill their responsibilities.  
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 This score was calculated by considering three indicators: the clarity of roles for the central and local 
government as provided by law; location of the actual responsibility for service delivery and where the 
responsibility of the civil servant is located. The highest score is 4 for a country which score better on these aspects 












The major problems faced by local governments in management capabilities are related to 
limited capacity in human resources concerning both administrative and technical personnel. 
Various studies (Minaloc, 2004 and Ndahimana, 2002) have revealed that there is a shortage in 
human resources at district level in terms of both quality and quantity. This situation is 
explained by financial constraints (low salaries). Although the law allows districts to recruit, 
they have not been able to attract those who are well qualified. Another factor that has been 
an obstacle to district management capacity is the fact that many districts are rural and less 
attractive to qualified personnel. Most qualified people prefer to work in cities where they are 
exposed to variety of opportunities that are rare in rural areas. Thus, disparities in the 
availability of qualified personnel at district level are interconnected with differences in 
financial capabilities in the area in which the district is located. 
4.2.5.2. Political decentralization 
In Rwanda, political decentralization was launched by organizing elections at local level. These 
elections do not involve political parties; only individuals are allowed to compete for positions. 
Elections allow people to sanction incumbents who did not perform well during their term and 
did not fulfill promises made during electoral campaigns. In 2002, compared to 30 African 
countries, political decentralization in Rwanda has a score of 2.5 as it is shown in the Figure 4 
below21. This implies that political empowerment of local communities is occurring and 
participation of local communities would therefore increase. In Rwanda political 
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 The score was constructed by considering the number of elected at sub-national tiers. The highest score being 4 
for a country which had more levels of sub-national government elected and local elections were fair and free. The 












decentralization has been achieved to lower levels. Local communities are able to elect their 
representatives and elections are held even at fourth and firth level.  
Figure 4: Extent of political decentralization Rwanda compared to 30 other African countries 
 
Source: Ndegwa (2002:3). 
For a representation system to take into account the needs of local communities, elected 
representatives and bureaucrats at local level should be accountable to local people. For this to 
occur, local communities should be in possession of a means to sanction those who have failed 
to fulfill their obligation to defend the interests of the local electorate. At this level, elections 
are the sole means people can utilize to recall ineffective representatives. Being elected, 
representatives are in contract with the electorate and they are obliged to ensure the 
satisfaction of community needs and promote programmes aimed at satisfying these needs. 
However, this can only occur when people are well informed about some important aspects of 












Rwanda, the principal of transparency in the management of public affairs at local level gives 
local communities the opportunity to be informed about what is being done by local 
government. For this purpose a ‘public accountability day’ is put in place to enable citizens to 
ask any question related to what is being done by central and local government and how public 
responsibilities are carried out. On this day, citizens are allowed to discuss and question their 
leaders on how they carry out their activities for a better understanding. This on one hand 
provides useful information that assists the making of sensitive decisions about authorities and 
on the other hand it helps those who receive requests to account for their activities and to 
practice a degree of self-regulation (Kigali City, 2008). Legal provision empowers local people to 
recall their elected leaders in cases where they do not deliver22. This can constitute a 
motivation for elected representatives to become more responsive. The Figure 5 below shows 
the accountability framework in Rwanda. As can be observed, citizens can influence 
accountability at both central and local level and of various actors involved in service delivery.    
Figure 5: Decentralized accountability relationship framework 
 
 Source: Republic of Rwanda, (2006).       
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 Though all possible means have been put in place to ensure the participation of local people, this is still far from 
being a reality due to the level of education of Rwandans. Local elites tend to capture all the power and the ruling 
party still has great influence on local governments. This impedes the quality of relationship between local 












Citizens may exercise their influence in different ways. Firstly they can raise their collective 
voice to influence policies in order to compel policy makers to reconsider some of their 
strategies or expenditure priorities by taking into consideration the aspirations and preferred 
needs. Secondary, they can influence service providers to improve the quality and quantity of 
services and the manner in which these public services are delivered. Thirdly, policy makers 
may hold service providers accountable. This can be influenced by the power of the citizen’s 
voice and threat of recall and or reelection. 
Although legal provision guarantees the availability of these means of holding local government 
officials accountable and responsible, this principle is impeded by the fact that the majority of 
the population is not educated and many documents are either written in French or English 
which many people are not able to read. 
4.2.5.2.3. Participation of citizens in policy formulation and implementation 
Though elections are the most common way of enabling participation of local communities in 
political and public affairs, the Rwandan government has added mechanisms to ensure 
effective participation of local communities in the formulation and implementation of 
development policies. Participation is enabled by the creation of the Community Development 
Committees (CDC) which has the role of leading the community planning process.   
The administrative and political structure of local government rearrangement has enabled the 
participation of local people in the formulation and implementation of policies. Each layer of 












CDCs at cell level, sector level and district level. The process requires CDCs at cell level to 
prepare cell development plans by prioritizing local needs. It is at this level that local 
communities contribute significantly to influence development programmes in the district, 
because these plans should be approved by the Cell council (the akagari council). The Akagari 
council is composed of all individuals aged of 18 years and above who live in the Akagari. These 
plans are thereafter referred to CDCs at sector level which establish the priorities at sector 
level. The CDCs at district level use development plans from the CDCs at sector level to 
formulate districts development plans. The selection of the priorities at district level is done 
according to available funds. Figure 6 below shows how local and central level interacts in 
formulation and implementation of development policies through CDC. Figure 7 depicts 























Figure 6: Community development planning framework 2001-2005  
 














Figure 7: District community development planning framework since 2006 
 
Source: Minaloc       
Frameworks in Figure 6 and 7 show that development planning according to Rwanda’s 
decentralization policy is, in principal at least, bottom-up. This implies that local government 
should consider the needs of their communities while planning the economic development of 
the whole district.   
The success of development programmes and policies and the sustainability of development 
depend on their degree of acceptance and ownership by local communities. The involvement of 
local people in the formulation of priorities is a way of insuring their participation at the 
implementation phase. In Rwanda, participation of local communities may imply sometimes 












the contribution of the population. It is in this respect that the “Umuganda” is a way of 
enabling people to participle in the execution of some development activities at local level. This 
is an activity based on tradition which is organized once a month. It gathers local communities 
to work on a project or an activity of community importance. These activities may include 
cleaning identified places, repairing bridges, roads, planting trees, etc. These activities are 
concluded by a meeting in which all resident discuss issues of common interest and evaluate 
the progress made so far in development. It should be noted that despite the 
institutionalization of the Umuganda, local governments do not utilize it efficiently.  
Another form of participation by local communities in the implementation of policies is 
Ubudehe. Through this approach, local communities are enabled to participate in planning and 
budgeting at the cell and village level. As result, depending on what communities have set as 
priorities, cells have been engaged in the realization of some development activities such as 
increasing access to water and poverty reduction oriented activities. The establishment of the 
umuganda and ubudehe   shows recognition of the capabilities of local people to contribute to 
development by participating in identifying community needs and implementing what they 
have identified as their development priorities (Republic of Rwanda, 2006: 12).  
Through ubudehe local communities have not only been able to participate in development but 
also local governments have been able to allocate their resources to developing infrastructures 
and pro-poor programmes. Actually, the Ubudehe is the most used way of combating poverty at 
local level by involving local communities in the identification of their most pressing needs. The 












actions of common interest. This is done by initiating people and decentralized entities in 
participative planning and identifications of their priorities. It has also been a means of 
consolidating and reinforcing good governance and reconciliation among local people. Actions 
of Ubudehe are undertaken at cell level and are coordinated by the Districts. Identified 
priorities are financed and in each cell two poor families are identified for financial support for 
the project they wish to undertake in order to improve their well-being.  
As it is showed in table A1 (Appendix A), through the support of the Ubudehe programme, 
various projects have been undertaken in different areas of the country. The same table 
displays the number of projects by Province.  Animal husbandry is the most preferred project 
by local communities. The reason being that not only they beneficiate by selling the animal 
produce but also animal waste are used to fertilize their cultivated land. And for long animal 
has been a sign of better off and wealth and way of saving. Thus the possession of animal 
husbandry allows the household to cover school charges or any health care charges. Thus the 
serving of the peasant is proportional to the number of animal owned. Figure A1 (Appendix A) 
depicts fund disbursed to districts to finance projects identified by local communities compared 
to total expenditure 2001 to 2003 and 2006.    
Except the district of Gisagara which does not appear on the Figure and in the table, meaning 
that it did not receive these transfers, all districts have received financial support for poverty 
reduction. Districts that have received little financial support are Huye, Nyanza, Kicukiro and 
Nyarugenge. These districts are either fully urban or semi-urban. This shows poverty disparity 
between rural and urban areas. Districts which have received more financial support for 












received more financial support compared to others are Gicumbi, Bugesera, Nyamagabe, 
Rulindo, Nyamasheke, Musanze, Muhanga, Rusizi and Karongi with an amount which is over 
250 million Rwandan Francs. The rest have received an amount which is between 100 and 250 
million Rwandan francs. An amount of FRW 700.000 is allocated to the cell to be distributed as 
a rotation loan to the identified poorest households in villages.        
4.2.6.3. Fiscal decentralization 
Fiscal decentralization provides decentralized entities with the necessary resources to 
undertake their functions. With regard to poverty reduction, local governments will only be 
successful if they possess resources that allow them implement development programs and 
ensure greater service delivery. The policy has defined the tax basis of districts and has 
determined how districts will benefit from transfers from central government (Republic of 
Rwanda, 2006). Efficiency in management and resource mobilization is crucial for attaining real 
sustainable development. Since 2001, when decentralization was materialized by elections, the 
Government of Rwanda has put in place the legal framework to reinforce the implementation 
of decentralization in general and of fiscal decentralization in particular. 
Since decentralization has occurred the sources of financing for local governments have varied 
and increased. There are two major sources of financial resources: fiscal resources and non 
fiscal resources. District’s fiscal resources are composed of business licenses, rental income tax, 
property tax and fees. Whereas non fiscal resources are constituted by government transfers, 
grants from donors and bank loans. Government transfers  constitute 5% of domestic revenue, 












Common Development Fund) which is 10% of domestic revenue, and any other donor funding, 
(earmarked or conditional transfer for capital expenditure). The Block or earmarked grants are 
aimed at covering budget obligations or administrative functions while the un-earmarked are 
granted to district to finance service delivery (Republic of Rwanda, 2005:12).   
In a comparison with other African countries, Rwanda appears in the same group as Ghana, 
Tanzania, Senegal, Congo Brazzaville, DRC and Burundi with a score between 2 and 2.523 (see 
the Figure 8 below). Rwanda has scored lower on fiscal decentralization compared to other 
components of decentralization, for example political and administrative decentralization.      
Figure 8: Extent of fiscal decentralization in Rwanda compared to 30 other African countries 
    
Source: Ndegwa (2002:3). 
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 This score is obtained by using two indicators: the arrangement for fiscal transfers from central government to 
local entities and the proportion of public expenditure controlled by local governments. The country for which 
these aspects are operational scores 4 while the lowest score is 0 for a country which does not have these 













There are differences in development levels between regions, districts and between rural and 
urban areas. If in the process of decentralization these differences are not taken into 
consideration, they may lead not only to unbalanced resource distribution but also to the 
deepening development differences across the country. To prevent the deepening of these 
disparities, the policy of decentralization suggests certain criteria which include population size, 
accessibility to public services, economic viability and environmental considerations (Republic 
of Rwanda, 2000:11). These differences in development level have contributed to equalize 
financial transfer and distribution between districts. This process is referred to as asymmetrical 
decentralization (PNUD, 2002:5).  
Asymmetrical decentralization helps to provide assistance to districts with fewer financial 
resources and therefore ensure that all districts are empowered to fulfill their functions and 
responsibilities. For this purpose, the Government of Rwanda has established a formula 
(equation 1, Appendix B) which is used in calculations of funds to be transferred to each district. 
The formula specifies parameter to be used and each parameter has been attributed a note. 
For block grants, the following elements are considered: district population size account for 
30% of the grant, district area accounts for 10%, and poverty index (measured by differences in 
district tax revenue) account for 40% and finally the performance index accounts for 20%. 
(www.minaloc.gov.rw). This formula is only applied to districts with a REVECAP lower than one 
third of the highest REVECAP in order not only to ensure equalization between districts but also 












included in this category of districts because their REVECAP is greater than on third of the 
highest REVECAP (www.minaloc.gov.rw).   
A different formula (equation 2 Appendix B) is applied for earmarked grants. These grants are 
managed by the CDF and the following formula is a used for the distribution of funds meant for 
development projects of districts. The criteria used enable the equalization of investment funds 
by considering differences in development. The criteria distribute points as shown in Appendix 
A. These formulas are key indicators of how the government of Rwanda is willing to empower 
local governments with essential tools that will enable the reduction of poverty in all parts of 
Rwanda. The asymmetrical decentralization will ensure that all districts are at the same time 
undertaking actions against poverty.    
4.3. Data presentation 
Now that we have reviewed Rwanda’s policy of decentralization, the next question has to do 
with the degree to which decentralization has actually been implemented. In this section, I 
review a range of data that I have collected on four (resource mobilization, development 
infrastructure investment, capacity and participation) main aspects of decentralization 
implementation. This section of the chapter presents data collected during the investigation 
done to evaluate the implementation of the policy of decentralization adopted by the 
Government of Rwanda for poverty reduction. These data include:  
- The voter turnout and number of cooperatives by district 












- Development expenditure (on education, health, water and roads) of District 
governments 
- Level of education of district personnel       
4.3.1. Voter turnout and Cooperatives 
The participation of local communities in local election provides one indicator of popular 
attitudes toward decentralization and the degree to which people are willing to participate in 
the affaires of local government. As seen in Figure 9, 96.06% of registered voters participated in 
local elections at district level in 2001 and 90.89% in 2006. This shows how enthusiastic local 
communities are when electing their representatives at district, sector and cell level.  
 
Source: National Electoral Commission (2001 and 2006 reports). 
Although there are no available data on voter turnout at district level in 2001, it is clear from 
the data available at provincial level that the participation of people in local elections is high. 













Source: National Electoral Commission (2001). 
Voter turnout in 2001 (see Figure 10 above) was high because it was the first time that people 
were asked to choose their leaders at the local level. It was for them a new democratic 
experience and they had high expectations of those in whom they placed their faith. However 
the 2006 elections revealed a slight decrease (Figure 11), though voter turnout in different 
districts reflected in some manner the situation of 2001. In most districts the voter turnout was 
still above 90%. Some districts had a lower voter turnout of between 79% and 89%. Most of 
these districts are either in Kigali City, provincial capitals, or small centers’ (Ruhango, Huye, 
Nyanza, Nyarugenge, Gasabo and Kicukiro). Others in that range are rural or peripheral to Kigali 
City. These districts are Kamonyi, Rulindo (peripheral to Kigali City) and Ngororero, Nyaruguru 














Source: National electoral commission reports at different districts (2006). 
Though elections are the most common method of local participation in the political life of a 
district, cooperatives provide another way for people to participate in different development 
activities in the district. In rural areas, the most important civil society groups are cooperatives. 
They can play an important role in improving agricultural techniques and increasing member’s 
incomes. They are also a way of strengthening social capital at local level and in rural areas in 
particular. The law determining the organization and functioning of district authorities requires 
districts to work closely with cooperatives and other associations at local level in order to 


















Source: Rwanda Cooperative Agency, Minicom (2006).  
Figure 12 above shows the distribution of cooperatives registered with the ministry of 
commerce in each district in 2006. The total number of registered cooperatives is 2440, and the 
majority of them are agricultural based. The district of Bugesera has the highest number of the 
total of cooperatives, followed by Kicukiro, Musanze, Gakenke, Nyagatare, Rulindo and Rusizi. 
Districts with the lowest number of cooperatives are Gisagara, Nyaruguru, Nyanza, Ngororero 
and Kayonza.     
4.3.2. District Government Income and expenditure 
Since the implantation of decentralization policy, local revenues have increased through both 
redistribution of transfers from the central government and through raising their own revenue. 












service delivery though much has still to be done in this regard. This improvement has been 
facilitated by extending the tax base of districts and transfers from central government. 
As shown in the Figure 13 below, the level of tax income have increased over time in most of 
the districts and particularly in 2006. Between 2001 and 2003 variations in tax income have 
been observed and income has increased progressively with the exception of the districts of 
Huye and Gakenke in which tax income has been reducing. Only the district of Kirehe has seen 
its income diminished in 2002. The increase of tax income in the majority of districts is 
explained by the implementation of the fiscal decentralization policy.  
 
Source: Districts financial reports 
Some districts which had a higher income in 2003 (Nyarugenge, Rubavu, Rutsiro, Ngororero, 
Kayonza and Karongi) have seen their income reduced in 2006. This decrease may be explained 












personnel to do the job. Also, tax collectors tend to report an amount of taxes which is lower to 
that expected and most of them tend to get bribed by tax payers. The rest of the districts have 
seen their income from taxes increase in 2006.   
Figure 14 below depicted that, transfers from central government have increased year after 
year with the highest increments in 2006. These are the effects of central government’s 
commitment to fiscal decentralization.  
 
Source: Districts financial reports 
Fiscal decentralization has contributed to a massive increase in income per capita districts 
government (see Figure 15 below). In 2001, income per capita was very low in all districts. 
However districts of Kigali City were the only to have a high income per capita for the 6 years. 












capita in 2006, while Gasabo, Huye and Nyarugenge have a high income per capita for the same 
year24.  
 
Source: Districts financial reports 
Not only has income per capita increased but the expenditure per capita has also increased 
over the five years with a very significant increase in 2006. 
                                                           
24
 Income per capita is calculated on the total income of districts (tax income plus government transfers) and the 













Source: Districts financial reports 
As shown in Figure 16 above, expenditure per capita has been high in districts of Kigali City over 
the 4 years. In 2006 districts of Kirehe, Gakenke and Musanze had the lowest increase in 
expenditure per capita. All districts have registered a high expenditure per capita in 2006, and 
this increment occurred over the 4 years25.   
4.3.3. Development expenditure (on education, health, water and roads) 
In Figure 17 below, total expenditure per capita on education health, water and roads of all 
districts is presented. Districts of Gicumbi, Karongi, Ngoma, Nyagatare, Nyamasheke and 
Ruhango have a high expenditure per capita on education while Nyarugenge and Musanze have 
the lowest expenditure per capita on education. Kayonza, Kirehe, and Nyagatare have the 
highest per capita expenditure on roads. 
                                                           
25
 Expenditure per capita is calculated on the total expenditure of districts (tax income plus government transfers) 













 Source: Districts financial reports and CDF 
The lowest per capita expenditure on roads is observed in Bugesera, Huye, Burera and 
Gakenke. On health, a high per capita expenditure is observed in Gatsibo, Muhanga and Karongi 
while a low per capita expenditure on health is observed in Kicukiro, Burera and Gasabo. On 
water, districts with the highest per capita expenditure are Kirehe, Nyarugenge, Ruhango, 
Gisagara while the lowest is observed Nyanza, Bugesera, Burera, Gakenke, Gasabo, Huye, 
Kicukiro. All districts are engaged in development activities and in particular in service delivery 
than they have been before decentralization. This has been made possible by devolving 
decision making power and resources to districts. 
4.3.4. Development infrastructures  
The law organizing decentralization in Rwanda stipulates that it is the responsibility of the 












service delivery. To do so, the district is required not only to maintain existing infrastructure but 
also create new ones. 
Health facilities and sanitation 
The availability of health facilities has been at the center of the improvement of health service 
delivery as part of the government’s decentralization policy. In particular local leaders have 
been involved in community mobilization. Figure 29 below display the number of health 
facilities per 1000 inhabitants by district. 
 
Source: Ministry of Health. 
Since 2001, there has been a slight improvement in the availability of health facilities. Number 
of health facilities per 1000 inhabitants reduced Districts of Kicukiro, Gasabo, Nyamasheke, 
Ngoma, Nyagatare, Huye, Rubavu and Ngororero between 2001 and 2002 while for the same 












Rulindo, Ruhango, Kirehe, Gisgara and Rwamagana. A significant decrease occurred in Kicukiro, 
Gasabo and Rubavu26.  
With regard to access to clean water, results from the two EICVs show that the overall 
percentage of households with access to clean water decreased from 64.4% as recorded in the 
2000/2001 EICV to 64.2% as shown in the 2005/06 EICV, while the percentage of those with no 
access to clean water has increased by 0.2% (35.6% in EICV1 and 35.4% in EICV2). There has not 
been any change in access to clean water. The Figure below displays Figures from the 2002 
census of the population and those from the EICV 2006. As is shown in some districts the 
percentage of households with access to clean water have dropped significantly (Nyabihu, 
Nyagatare, Huye, Nyamagabe and Nyaruguru) while in some others there has been an increase 
(Nyarugenge, Rulindo, Musanze, Rubavu, Gasabo, Bugesera, Gakenke, Gisagara, Kicukiro and 
Rutsiro).    
 
Source: 3-RGPH 2002 and EICV 2005/2006 
                                                           
26
 This decrease is explained by the measures and conditions set by the Ministry of Health which aimed at tracking 
those health facilities which were operating without required human and material resources. And in particular it 













Net enrolment at primary and secondary schools increased between the two EICV. For primary 
school, net enrolment increased from 73.7% as shown in the 2000/2001 EICV to 85.9% as 
demonstrated in the 2005/2006 EICV. In rural areas, net enrolment at primary school increased 
from 72.9% to 85.1%, while in urban area it increased from 82.7% to 90.4% in Kigali city and 
from 74.1% to 90.1% in other urban areas. The gross enrolment also increased from 110.5% to 
140.2%. In rural areas it increased from 109.9% to 139.9% while in urban areas it increased 
from 128% to 130% in Kigali City and from 115.2% to 149.6% for other urban area. The net 
enrolment for secondary school has improved from 6.9% as recorded in the 2000/01 EICV to 
10% as shown in the 2005/06 EICV. These rates are higher in urban areas (23.6% to 29.1% in 
Kigali City and from 9.3% to 13.8% fro other urban) than in rural areas (from 5% to 7%). The 
Figure below which shows the distribution of primary and secondary schools per 1000 
inhabitant by district provide an explanation about the increase of enrolment rate in primary 
and secondary school. The number of school per 1000 inhabitants declined in Karongi, 
Ngororero districts while it has increased significantly in Nyaruguru, Ruhango, Rulindo, Gicumbi, 
Kirehe and Gisagara districts. The only district with a small number of schools per 1000 
inhabitant is Nyarugenge. All districts have registered an increase in number of secondary 
schools per 1000 inhabitants with the exception of the district of Nyanza (see Figure 31 and 32 
below). A significant increase occurred in districts of Ruhango, Rulindo, Ngoma and Gisagara 

















Though many indicators show an improvement in the well-being of the Rwandan population, 












corroborates other evidence that Rwanda is still a poor country and the government needs 
further strategies to bring in changes in terms of poverty reduction.  
4.3.5. Level of education of district personnel 
Conception, execution and monitoring of development programmes require a certain level of 
qualification. Figure 18 and 19 below show differences in availability of human resources at 
district level. It can be observed that urban districts tend to have a higher percentage of 
qualified personnel while rural districts experience qualified human resource shortages.  
 
Source: District financial reports, 2004.  
The district of Nyarugenge, Rwamagana, Gasabo, Bugesera, Huye and Ruhango have a high 
percentage of qualified personnel with university degree A0 (four years of university) the 
highest being that of Nyarugenge. Other districts and cities have a percentage which is between 
5 and 10. The only district that has any qualified personnel with A0 level qualifications is 












Bugesera, has a high percentage compared to other rural districts. However many districts have 
a personnel with the A1 or BACC (2 years of university) qualification and the districts which 
score highest in this regard is Kayonza, Nyarugenge, Kicukiro, Nyagatare, Nyabihu, Burera, 
Gasabo and Gakenke. As the Figure above show, the majority of district personnel are 
individuals who have only completed high school and those who have other qualification. In 
some districts (Kirehe, Karongi, Gisagara, Ngororero, Nyamasheke, Rutsiro and Ngoma) the 
majority of personnel have no qualification (incomplete secondary school or primary).  
The above Figure indicates that districts are confronted with a shortage in human resources. 
Local government structures dominated by a category of less educated and unqualified 
personnel may constitute an impediment to the fight against poverty. This affects service 
delivery through limiting the ability of local government staff to analyze and understand 
problems expressed by local communities and measures to be taken in this regard. 
However, the situation has changed since 2006. The Government of Rwanda has reduced the 
number of districts from 106 to 30 and reduced the number of personnel at central level while 
increasing the number of qualified personnel at district level. To reduce differences in salaries 
and attract more qualified individuals to the districts, salaries of district personnel were 













Source: Districts offices and District development Plan. 
Figure 19 above shows that the overall percentage of personnel with A0 qualifications is above 
77% while the percentage of those with A1 and A2 qualifications (6 years of high school) is 
respectively 12% and 10.1%. Each district has now a percentage of personnel with A0 
qualification which is above 50%. The district with the lowest percentage of personnel with A0 
qualifications is Nyagatare (57.1%) while the districts with the highest percentage of the same 
category of personnel are Rwamagana with about 91% followed by Nyamasheke (89.3%), 
Kirehe (88.9%), Gisagara (87.1%), Nyabihu (84.2%), Rusizi (82.5%) and Gicumbi (81%). Districts 
of Bugesera, Burera, Kicukiro, Ngoma and Nyagatare have the highest percentage of personnel 
with A1 level qualifications while Rutsiro Musanze, Rwamagana score lowest for the same 
category. The districts of Nyagatare, Musanze and Rutsiro have the highest percentage of 













It can be observed that at the time of the implementation of decentralization, districts had a 
shortage of human resources and the government attempted to address this problem in 2006. 
Though today districts seem to have an increment in human resources, they are still less 
attractive to qualified people, particularly rural districts. From most of the district’s reports it 
can be observed that some posts are either filled by less qualified personnel or are vacant.      
4.4. Problems 
Though the government of Rwanda has undertaken all it can to enable local government be 
more effective in fulfilling their duties, there are persistent problems. Local governments lack 
capacity to access resources because their fiscal base is still small though it has been enlarged 
by central government. Nowadays local governments target those activities which are relevant 
for local communities. This results in a shortage of financial resources to ensure their financial 
autonomy and commitment to development activities. This problem is also amplified by the 












retention capacities for their personnel, as most qualified personnel still prefer to work in cities 
where they are in contact with opportunities. The issue of poverty will only be tackled if 
capable personnel and with financial resources are available. The next chapter discusses 






















CHAPTER 5: POVERTY IN RWANDA 
The previous chapter discussed Rwanda’s decentralization policy and its implementation. It 
dealt with the strengths and weaknesses of the implementation and in particular the major 
threats to its success with regard to the objective of poverty reduction. The following chapter 
discusses poverty in Rwanda and some actions taken to reduce poverty. Firstly, an overview of 
poverty in Rwanda is presented followed by a discussion on causes of poverty in Rwanda and 
the characteristics of the poor in Rwanda. Secondly, it presents strategies adopted to fight 
poverty and thirdly, this chapter presents data on poverty change in Rwanda.    
5.1. Overview of poverty in Rwanda  
Poverty is not a new experience in Rwanda. It has been the central issue facing successive 
governments from colonial rule to post independence governments after independence and to 
the current government. Rwanda is one of the poorest countries in the world27. Until the early 
1980s, however, it was among the countries with the most equally distributed resources, which 
can be explained by traditional customs that provide some guarantees to the poor. Hence up to 
1983 Rwanda was considered at least egalitarian in terms of resource distribution between 
poor and rich28. Compared to neighboring countries such as the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo (DRC) and Uganda, Rwanda was in a better social-economic situation. However, the 
introduction of liberalization and structural adjustment in 1986-1987, as suggested by the IMF, 
destroyed this economic equilibrium and inequalities increased (see Maton, 1994). Economic 
hardship among rural communities could be observed and the situation became more critical in 
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28












1986-1987. During this period the gap between agricultural revenue and non-agricultural 
deepened. Agricultural revenue decreased while revenue from non agricultural sources 
increased. This indicates that a small group of the privileged was gaining more than the 
majority of Rwandans, as displayed in the Figure 21 below.  
 
Source: Maton, 1994 and EICV 2001 and EICV 2006. 
In 1989, some regions were confronted by famine with the Southern region most affected. 
Inequalities in resource distribution increased drastically between 1984 and 1992. Though there 
were signs of economic deterioration, the country’s human development index had been 

















The greatest deterioration occurred between 1985 and 2000. The human development index of 
2000 was the same as that of 1980. Since 2000 there has been an improvement. This shows 
how the country is developing. This improvement of human development index is also 
corroborated by the increase of the gross domestic product (purchasing power parity) from 














Concerning poverty the Figure 24 below show that since 1985 the number of households below 
the poverty line has been increasing and that between 1994 and 1997 the percentages were 
between 70% and 78%, with the year 1994 registering the highest percentage. For all years, 
rural areas have the highest percentages of households below the poverty line. After 1985 the 
percentage of households below the poverty line increased, but after 1999 the percentage of 
poor households decreased. The percentage of households under poverty line increased 
significantly in both rural and urban areas in 1994, as a result of the genocide. In urban area, 
the percentage of households under the poverty line decreased between 2000 and 2001 but 















Source: The Government of Rwanda Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, 2002:14 and EICV 2001 and EICV 2006. 
If the genocide has deeply affected both rural and urban areas, there were already signs of a 
declining socio-economic situation in Rwanda before this tragedy, which was accelerated by a 
decline in agriculture production and particularly food production and the fall in the price of 
coffee on international markets. 
5.2. Poverty reduction strategies 
The will of the Government of Rwanda to combat poverty is strong and expressed in the 
“National Strategy for Poverty Reduction”. This document describes in detail the main priorities 
for poverty reduction. The poverty strategy aims at reducing poverty with the following key 
actions:  
o Transformation of agriculture and rural development 
o Development of economic infrastructures 












o Development of the private sector 
o Development and use of information and communication technologies (ICT) 
o Development of human capital. 
These key actions are linked to the government’s long term development strategy known as 
“Vision 2020” which is based at the following pillars:  
o Good political and economic governance: this includes building an effective public 
sector, transparency, accountability and efficiency in allocation of resources and 
ensuring participation of local communities through decentralization. 
o Human resource development and a knowledge-based economy: the attention is 
put on improving overall education levels and in particular in management and 
applied and natural sciences. Also targeted is the improvement of health by reducing 
infant and maternal mortality, putting in place health policies targeting the poorest 
and by encouraging family planning and reducing HIV/AIDS prevalence. 
o Private sector-led economy: the point here is that the government plays the role of 
catalyst by putting in place infrastructure, human resources and legal frameworks to 
stimulate economic growth and investment.     
o Infrastructure development: emphasis is on land management, urban development, 
transport, communication and ICT, energy, water and waste management. 
o Productive high value and market oriented agriculture 
o Regional and international integration (Republic of Rwanda, 2000).  
The implementation of these strategies for poverty reduction is done through medium-term 












EDPRS. The PRSP which was implemented from 2002 to 2005 focused more on reconstruction 
and rehabilitation. Development plans at national and local level were then prepared in 
accordance with the PRSP for the period 2002 to 2005. Building upon the experience of the 
PRSP, the EDPRS suggests more consistent measures to ease the poverty implementation 
process. It reviews and redefines priorities in Rwanda by placing emphasis on the consolidation 
and extension of public spending, decentralization and the recognition of the contribution of 
the private sector in boosting economic growth (Republic of Rwanda, 2007:1). In all these 
documents (PRSP, EDPRS and Vision 2020), decentralization is stated as a priority in order to 
ensure better outcomes in development. Thus, all development plans of districts have been 
elaborated in conformity with the county’s Vision 2020, PRSP and EDPRS. In this regard the 
Government of Rwanda has gone further by requesting different layers of local government to 
elaborate their Vision 2020 (down to village level) with the clear objective of accelerating 
poverty reduction in local communities. This is recognition of the capacity of local governments 
to contribute to poverty reduction. Allowing them to plan their own development is to enable 
the government and development partners to target the most pressing needs for poverty 
reduction.  
5.3. Poverty variation in Rwanda 
After the 1994 genocide, poverty reduction dominated the government agenda and many 
surveys were conducted for a better understanding of the root causes of poverty. Since then 
poverty has been estimated not at household level but at the level of individuals. The EICV 
2000/2001 and 2005/2006 give an indication of trends in poverty in Rwanda after the genocide. 












occurred in all areas of the country. However, it can be observed that rural areas are still poorer 
than urban areas. This indicates that poverty in Rwanda is more a rural phenomenon.       
 
Source: National Institutes of Statistics of Rwanda, 2006 (EICV1 and EICV2) 
Although the percentage of people below the poverty line declined between 2001 and 2006, 
the variation in the Gini coefficient shows that inequalities still exist. The Gini coefficient rose 
from 0.473 to 0.508 during that period.  
Poverty incidence levels vary also geographically. This is in part explained by differences in 
availability of potentialities and opportunities. Depending largely on agricultural activities to 
feed themselves, Rwandan households in some regions face scarcity of land to cultivate due to 
the large population and poor soil. Thus, in Rwanda poverty incidence tends to be higher in 
rural areas than in urban areas. Poverty has been reduced in 17 out of 12 districts between the 
two EICV surveys. As the table 2 and Figure 26 below show, the highest fall (beyond 10%) in 
poverty reduction occurred in the districts of Bugesera (32.4%), Rwamagana (13.4%), Musanze 












occurred in the districts of Karongi (7.5%), Kayonza (8.2%), Kirehe (9.5%), Ngoma (8.7%), 
Nyamasheke (6.7%), Nyarugenge (8.8%) and Nyanza (5%). Overall, the districts of the Eastern 
Province have had a better score in terms of poverty reduction compared to districts of other 
provinces. They are followed by those of Northern Province. Districts of the Southern province 
have lower negative scores in terms of poverty reduction. Thus, poverty has increased in twelve 
districts and five of them are located in Southern Province, two in the Northern Province and 
two in Eastern Province. The districts in which poverty has increased substantially are Kamonyi 
(10.9%), Rutsiro (9.1%), Rubavu (8.7%), Huye (4.7%) and Burera (4.7%). The rest of the twelve 
districts have had an increase which is between 0.3 and 2.5%. The districts of Gatsibo and 
Muhanga have the lowest increase in poverty.   
Table 2: Change in Poverty headcounts in Rwanda by District 




Bugesera 89.2% 56.7% 32.5% 
Burera 73.2% 77.8% -4.7% 
Gakenke 62.0% 58.4% 3.6% 
Gasabo 30.5% 26.3% 4.2% 
Gatsibo 56.4% 57.1% -.7% 
Gicumbi 63.7% 66.5% -2.7% 
Gisagara 80.1% 78.5% 1.6% 
Huye 62.0% 66.8% -4.8% 
Kamonyi 43.7% 54.6% -10.9% 
Karongi 68.6% 61.0% 7.5% 
Kayonza 48.9% 40.6% 8.2% 
Kicukiro 24.1% 20.2% 3.9% 
Kirehe 70.3% 60.7% 9.5% 
Muhanga 51.0% 51.3% -.3% 
Musanze 67.3% 52.8% 14.5% 
Ngoma 57.9% 49.2% 8.7% 
Ngororero 62.7% 66.9% -4.2% 












Nyagatare 48.1% 50.3% -2.2% 
Nyamagabe 76.6% 75.3% 1.4% 
Nyamasheke 70.6% 63.9% 6.7% 
Nyanza 68.6% 64.1% 4.5% 
Nyarugenge 17.8% 9.0% 8.8% 
Nyaruguru 83.9% 86.1% -2.2% 
Rubavu 50.9% 59.6% -8.7% 
Ruhango 62.6% 64.2% -1.6% 
Rulindo 69.3% 55.7% 13.6% 
Rusizi 60.5% 59.1% 1.4% 
Rutsiro 58.5% 67.6% -9.1% 
Rwamagana 50.1% 36.7% 13.4% 
Total  60.4% 56.9% 3.6% 
 
 
Source: EICV200/2001 and EICV 2005/2006 
The overall picture indicates that poverty has reduced in both rural and urban districts, though 
rural districts remain more affected than urban. Some rural districts (Bugesera, Rulindo, 
Nyabihu, Kayonza, Kirehe and Nymasheke) have registered high positive scores in poverty 
change between the two surveys. Their scores are even higher than those of urban districts. 












occurred since 2001 has led to poverty reduction? This question will be discussed in the next 
chapter which aims to explore the link between poverty reduction and decentralization.    
Poverty in Rwanda can be explained in two dimensions: income poverty and social poverty. 
Poor households face problems in income generation which has an impact on social poverty. 
Low income prevents the poor from having access to health care and education, and limits their 
ability to improve their overall living conditions. The statistics presented in the previous section 
show how deep income poverty is in Rwanda. Income poverty is estimated from consumption 
expenditures and is determined by establishing a poverty line. In Rwanda, income analysis has 
led to the creation of two poverty lines. One is related to extreme poverty which is poverty in 
terms of food supply. This extreme poverty line is set at Frw 45,000 per adult per year. The 
other poverty line is used to understand the overall poverty incidence and is set at Frw 64,000 
per adult per year. Results from EICV 2000/2001 and EICV 2005/2006 show that between the 
two periods a decline has occurred in both overall poverty and extreme poverty. As shown in 
the Figure 27 below, the fall in extreme poverty occurred in rural areas and in Kigali while in 
other urban areas it has increased slightly. Data from the two EICV indicate that an increase in 
extreme poverty has occurred in Nyaruguru, Gisagara, Nyamagabe, Burera, Huye, Rutsiro, 
Ngororero and Rubavu. In the rest of districts there has been a fall in extreme poverty, the 














Source: National institutes of statistics of Rwanda, 2006 (EICV1 and EICV2) 
 
 
Source: National institutes of statistics of Rwanda, 2006 (EICV1 and EICV2) 
At national level, extreme poverty as indicated in EICV 2000/2001 fell from 41.3% to 39.9%. 














This chapter discussed poverty in Rwanda by underlining its causes and the strategies taken by 
the government to fight against it. Rwanda, despite the huge progress registered in the 
aftermath of genocide, has many challenges that may hinder its combat of poverty. To win the 
war against poverty, Rwanda should address its direct and indirect causes. One of the ways to 
do this is the building of institutions capable of responding to the needs of local communities 
and capable of opening up more opportunities to them. The first step has been taken with 
decentralization; and it is in the interest of local communities to make sure they help these 
institutions to be more effective and efficient and ensure that decentralization helps them get 
out of poverty. In this chapter it has been shown that levels of poverty fell from 60.4% to 56.9% 
between 2001 and 2006. This occurred when the government’s policy of decentralization was 
implemented and had among its objectives the reduction of poverty among Rwandans. The 
following chapter will try to show if there is any connection between this reduction in poverty 

















CHAPTER 6: EXPLORING THE LINK BETWEEN DECENTRALIZATION 
     AND POVERTY REDUCTION IN RWANDA 
6.1. Introduction 
Previous chapters have dealt with the overall situation of decentralization and poverty in 
Rwanda. In this chapter the focus will be on testing the hypothesis of the thesis empirically. The 
empirical test of the hypothesis will confirm the existence of a relationship between poverty 
change and other variables which include resource mobilization, government expenditure and 
developmental investment, capabilities of district staff, participation and the damage of 
genocide. The conjecture is statistically tested using these dimensions and a correlation will 
substantiate the relationship that may exist between the above variables and the level of 
poverty change. Confirmation of the effect of each of the variables on poverty reduction would 
determine whether decentralization as an institutional arrangement leads to poverty reduction. 
In this study, a negative correlation would imply that decentralization has contributed to 
poverty reduction while a positive correlation proves otherwise. The relationship between each 
of the variables of decentralization and poverty reduction is explored by running a bivariate 
correlation. The inference that decentralization has an effect on poverty reduction will be 
tested in different ways:  
1. Through an examination of the poverty reduction in relation to changes in income and 
expenditure per capita in all districts of Rwanda, 
2. By investigating what changes in poverty levels are related to the level of participation 












3. Through a study of changes in poverty levels and any link to changes in developmental 
investment (per capita expenditure on education, health, water and roads) and the 
number of schools and health facilities per 1000 inhabitants at district level, 
4. By considering poverty reduction in relation to the capabilities of district staff in terms 
of education levels, 
5. Finally, I test whether any observed relationships remain once we control for the impact 
of the genocide legacy on changes in poverty levels. 
6.2. Political decentralization and poverty reduction 
Political decentralization influences the level to which local people are empowered politically. 
This is expressed by the way local communities engage themselves in electing their leaders. Can 
the extent to which local communities in a district participate in electing their leaders explain 
subsequent poverty reduction in a district? This study attempts to empirically demonstrate the 
relationship between the level of poverty reduction and decentralization (participation in local 
elections) by using the EICV1 and EICV 2 survey data to measure changes in poverty. 2006 Voter 
turnout data from the Nation Electoral Commission will also be used for this purpose.  
The test of the impact of political participation on poverty reduction shows that there is weak 
negative relationship between levels of participation in local elections (as measured in 2006) 
and the level of poverty change (Pearson’s r=-0.295). The horizontal line denotes a zero point 
where there has not been any change in the level of poverty (for our study poverty change is 
the difference of the percentage of individuals below the poverty line in 2006 and individuals 












negative values indicate that poverty levels have declined). In this test the district of Bugesera 
appears to be the significant outlier followed by Rulindo, Nyarugenge, Kamonyi and Rutsiro. 
The case of Bugesera district is a particular one because of its famine background. For many 
years the inhabitants of the district faced famine in the dry season (mainly between June and 
August) causing migration during this period. During this period families leave their homes for 
other places to look for food and money to ensure their survival. The success with regard to 
poverty reduction is however explained by the implementation of government measures that 
seek to ensure that people do not suffer from hunger. Among other measures, local authorities 
have asked people not to sell their harvests at lower prices and ensured that people keep at 
least 30% of their harvest for their food and financial security. This measure which was not only 
implemented in the District of Bugesera but in all districts of the Eastern province was intended 
to allow local citizens to benefit from their agricultural produce by setting a minimum price for 
the produce and providing public storage means. From the Figure 33 below it can be seen that 
18 out the 30 districts which show a decrease in poverty also scored well on participation in 
local elections. Of the 18, only 3 districts had a low score while other scores are between 75% 
















If it can be observed that the majority of districts with a drop in poverty have a higher 
percentage of participation in local elections, the situation is also evident among those districts 
that have registered a deepening of poverty. This situation implies that in Rwanda 
decentralization can be seen to empower local people politically and poverty is not an 
impediment to political participation. When participation in local elections is correlated with 
poverty change by location of the district, empirical results indicate that there is a very weak 
linear relationship in urban (Appendix D) districts (Pearson’s r=-0.160). This relationship is 
moderate (Appendix E) and negative in rural districts (Pearson’s r=-0.426).    
Participation in elections is one way people can have a say in the management of the 












actively in the development of their districts. Here, the emphasis is on the extent to which 
individuals engage in activities that are likely to improve their lives and initiate actions that may 
force local governments to act in accordance with their wishes. In the context of this study 
particular attention is paid to cooperatives because not only the law on decentralization 
stipulates (article 7) that districts government should cooperate with cooperatives operating 
within the district29. Thus decentralization has allowed those communities that have a vibrant 
social capital to advantage of the policy and make a use of newly empowered local government 
to reduce poverty. The question to be answered here is whether the extent of cooperative 
presence affects subsequent levels of poverty in different districts. Here the study attempts to 
demonstrate empirically the relationship between poverty change and the number of 
cooperatives in each district using data form EICV2001 and EICV2006 and data from the 
Rwandan Cooperative Agency to measure poverty change. This test shows a negative, 
moderate strong correlation between the number of cooperatives per district and the extent of 
poverty change (Pearson’s r= -0.469).             
 
                                                           
29
 The government of Rwanda encourages people to group themselves into cooperatives in order to get access to 
loans. To reach this goal, an agency in charge of promoting cooperatives has been created since 2005. Since then 
most associations have shifted to the status of cooperatives for accessing advantages proposed by the 














However, when the location of the district is considered, results show that a linear relationship 
between the two variables is strong (Appendix E) in rural districts (Pearson’s r=-0.650) and 
moderately weak (Appendix D) in urban districts (Pearson’s r=-0.116). The main outliers from 
this negative moderate relationship are the districts of Rwamagana and Kamonyi. In the district 
of Bugesera, drop in poverty and the number of cooperatives follow indicate the existence of a 
relationship between poverty reduction and the number of cooperatives. As it can be seen in 
the Figure 34 above, the Bugesera district has the highest number of cooperatives and the 
highest level of poverty change. Rwandans and particularly those in rural areas group 
themselves in cooperatives for the purpose of improving their wellbeing by insuring mutual 












which they may bargain for better selling of their produce and help fill the gap which is created 
by bank conditions and resource availability.   
6.3. Resource mobilization and poverty reduction 
Resources are important to decentralization. The level of resource mobilization, financial 
autonomy and capabilities indicate the degree to which the objectives of decentralization can 
be realized. The question to be investigated here is whether the extent of resource mobilization 
has affected subsequent changes in poverty. The test shows that changes in district income per 














When district location is considered (urban or rural) the relationship strengthens very slightly 
for urban district (Pearson’s r=-0.148) but remains weak for rural districts (Pearson’s r=0,032).    
The overall picture indicates that an increase in income per capita of districts in Rwanda does 
not necessarily imply a decline in poverty levels. Most districts saw their income per capita 
increase between 2001 and 2006 (Nyaruguru District is the exception because its income per 
capita has declined), but not all of them registered a drop in poverty. But, what about the 
impact of expenditure on poverty reduction? The question to be investigated here is whether 
the extent of the increase in district expenditure per capita would have a subsequent effect on 














In Figure 36 above, the test indicates that the relationship between change in expenditure per 
capita and change in poverty level is very weak and positive (Pearson’s r=0.103). In other 
words, higher levels of expenditure seem to lead to more poverty than reducing it. In urban 
districts the relationship is weak (Pearson’s r=0.143) while in rural districts it does not exist 
(Pearson’s r=0.036). Between 2001 and 2006 expenditure per capita has increased in all 
districts. Yet not all of them had a drop in poverty as might have been expected. Some districts 
which registered a drop in the incidence of poverty (Gakenke, Kirehe, Musanze, Rulindo and 
Nyabihu) have a low level of change in expenditure per capita; while other districts 
(Nyamagabe, Kicukiro, Karongi, Nyanza, Nyarugenge, Rwamagana and Ngoma) registered a 
drop in poverty level and increase in expenditure per capita. This data therefore reveals that an 
increase in expenditure per capita does not necessarily imply a drop in poverty levels.  
6.4. Capacity 
Capacity in regard to government personnel is of great importance particularly in planning, 
monitoring and execution of development activities. A district with competent personnel may 
be expected to register successful execution of development programmes. I sought to find out 
if higher levels of education of district staff (which resulted from decentralization) may explain 
differences in poverty change in the districts of Rwanda. I used data from district offices to 













The test shows that a very weak positive correlation exists between the level of education of 
district staff and the level of poverty change (Pearson’s r=0.068). However, while change in 
personnel with a university degree correlates very weakly with change in poverty levels in 
urban districts (Pearson’s r=-0.053), in rural districts, the relationship is higher but still positive 
for urban districts (Pearson’s r=0.228). Besides Kayonza, Nyarugenge and Nyagatare districts, 
which have a low percentage of personnel with university degrees, the rest of the districts 
which had a fall in poverty levels have a high percentage of personnel with degrees (between 
70% and 90%).  
6.5. Developmental investment and poverty reduction 












Investment in social development infrastructure (schools, health and roads) should reduce 
poverty as it paves the way for more opportunities for people. This study intends also to 
explore the linkage between change in poverty and investment in social infrastructures per 
capita. The question to be investigated here is whether investment in social infrastructure 
affects subsequent changes in poverty levels. I use data from the EICV 2001 and EICV2006 
surveys for changes in poverty levels and data from district budget finance reports and CDF 
finance reports.  
In the Figure 38 below, poverty change is positively correlated with total expenditure per capita 
on education from 2001 to 2006, but weakly (Person’s r=0.155). This suggests that high 
expenditure on education may not necessarily lead to poverty reduction particularly in a short 
period 2001-2006. In urban districts expenditure on education and change in poverty levels 
correlate (Appendix D) more strongly, but still positively (Pearson’s r=0.315) while the 














Using the same data sources, I correlate per capita expenditure on health with changes on 
poverty. The empirical results as presented in the Figure below indicate that there is no linear 
relationship between the two variables (Pearson’s r=-0.009). In order to see whether the area 
of location would affect subsequent changes in poverty levels, a test to check for correlation 
between the two variables was run. Empirical results suggest that per capita expenditure on 
health correlates very weakly and negatively with changes in levels of poverty in urban districts 
(Pearson’s r=-0.072), while in rural districts the correlation is almost non-existent and negative 














Another element which falls in the development investment category is expenditure on water. 
The question here is whether the level of per capita expenditure on water affects subsequent 
changes in poverty. Here, I use data from district and CDF financial reports. Again, this test 
shows that per capita expenditure on water does not correlate (Pearson’s r is very weak and 
negative -0.028) with changes in levels of poverty. This implies that spending more on water 
does not improve the poverty status in districts. With regard to whether the district is rural or 
urban, the empirical results show that in rural districts the linear relationship between per 
capita expenditure on water and change in poverty levels is non-existent (Pearson’s r=-0.006) 
while in urban districts the two variables correlate very weakly and negatively (Pearson’s r=-















Another aspect analyzed under developmental investment is per capita expenditure on roads. 
Here the question is whether per capita expenditure on roads affects subsequent levels of 
poverty. Again using the same sources of data, empirical results, as shown in the Figure below, 
demonstrate that the linear relationship between these two variables is almost non-existent 
(Pearson’s r=0.047). The linear relationship between these two variables does not change if the 













This status may be due to the fact that the amount allocated to roads is still very low. 
Maintaining roads is very expensive and the roads are difficult to use during the rainy season 
because of the physical geography of the country. Thus increased expenditure on the road 
infrastructure has little impact on poverty reduction.    
6.5.2. Access to water 
Access to clean water is included because it among services to be delivered by local 
government. In contrast to previous, access to clean water correlates moderately and 
negatively with changes in poverty levels (Pearson’s r=-0.353) over the period 2002 and 2006. 
The main significant outlier is Bugesera which has an increase in poverty level. The relationship 












higher in rural districts (Appendix E) these two variables are moderately correlated (Pearson’s 
r=-0.481).    
 
The r2 displayed in the above Figure indicates that about 13% of the variations in poverty 
reduction are explained by an increase in access to clean water. In rural areas especially access 
to clean water makes a difference in contributing to poverty reduction. Fetching water is time 
consuming in rural areas and this has a negative impact on poverty reduction. Thus improving 
access to clean water does not only ensure health but it also supports poverty reduction.    
6.5.3. Availability of education infrastructures  
The availability of education should give individuals more opportunities and knowledge and 












of schools (primary and secondary) brought about subsequent changes in poverty levels in 
districts using data obtained from the Ministry of education for the number of schools in each 
district, this study attempts to empirically demonstrate the relationship between these two 
variables.  
The results of the test indicate that change in availability of schools or the number of schools 
correlates weakly with the level of poverty change. Overall changes in the availability of primary 
schools do not correlate (Pearson’s r=-0.039) with changes in poverty levels. However, in urban 
districts the availability of primary schools per 1000 inhabitants (Appendix D) correlates 
moderately strongly, but positively (Pearson’s r=0.408) with the level of change in poverty. 













The overall correlation between change in the number of secondary schools per 1000 
inhabitants and the change in poverty level is weak but negative (Pearson’s r=-0.171). In rural 
districts, the correlation (Appendix E) between these two variables is stronger (Pearson’s r=-
0.314) while it does not exist in urban districts. Therefore, building schools in rural areas seem 
assisting in poverty reduction.    
  
6.5.4. Availability of health facilities 
The availability of health infrastructure is crucial in ensuring individual’s health and providing 
guarantee of rapid recovery from illnesses. By offering health care to people, the availability of 
health care facilities provides guarantee of the productivity of individuals. Long period of 
illnesses has a negative implication on people’s productivity and therefore on the overall 












situation of the district is likely to be affected. This section attempts to explore the link between 
the availability of health facilities and changes in poverty levels. Here the question which will 
guide this investigation is whether the extent of health facilities affects subsequent changes in 
poverty. The relationship between the two variables is demonstrated empirically by using data 
from the EICV 2001 and EICV 2006 surveys for changes in poverty levels and data from the 
Ministry of health for the number of health facilities in the districts. The results from the test 
show that there is a very weak correlation between availability of health facilities (number of 
health facilities per 1000 inhabitants) and change in poverty levels (Pearson’s r=-0.077). The 













6.6. The legacy of genocide 
As mentioned earlier in section 2.2.1.4 of chapter 2, ethnic conflicts and civil wars is another 
cause of poverty. In Rwanda, the 1994 genocide deepened poverty among Rwandans who were 
already suffering since the 1980s when the price of coffee fell on the international market. The 
genocide destroyed the country’s infrastructure and left behind a broken society with many 
challenges. Those who were mostly affected are widows and children. This category of the 
population is forced to assume responsibilities that were otherwise meant for men and adults 
in the Rwandan society. Children became heads of households and women became responsible 
for sustaining their families. But with low levels of education or no education at all, they could 
not get well paying jobs. All these genocide consequences still constitute an impediment to 
development though significant improvement has been made in dealing with some of them. In 
this study, attention is given to the impact of the presence of widows and orphans of the 
genocide on changes in the poverty levels. The question this study aims at investigating is 
whether the presence of widows and orphans of the genocide may constitute third variable to 
the relationships already found. This would therefore help assess whether poverty reduction in 
Rwanda is a result of a simple recovery from the holocaust of 1994. The investigation is 
undertaken by contrasting the change in poverty levels with the percentage of widows in each 
district on one hand and the percentage of orphans of the genocide on the other hand. The 















Source: Minaloc et Minecofin : Recensement des Rescapes du Génocide de 1994, 2008. 
Districts with a high percentage of genocide widows are Gisagara, Nyamagabe, Burera, Huye, 
Kamonyi, Karongi, Ngoma, Ngororero, Nyanza, Ruhango and Rwamagana. The lowest 
percentage is located in Nyabihu district and Gicumbi.  
 












The districts with a high percentage of orphans are Nyabihu, Rutsiro, Rubavu, KicukiroGasabo, 
Nyarugenge and Bugesera. The lowest percentages are observed in the districts of Rusizi, 
Gatsibo, Gicumbi and Nyaruguru. However, the percentage of orphan survivors of genocide is 
high in districts of Gisagara, Nayamagabe, Kamonyi, Nyamasheke, Ngoma, Karongi, Gakenke, 
Ngororero, Nyanza, Ruhango, and Rwamagana. The districts with the lowest percentage are 
Nyabihu and Gicumbi. These categories are among the vulnerable groups and become so 
because of the loss through genocide of those who were supporting families. Thus the genocide 
has also contributed to the deterioration of well- being among Rwandans.  Given this situation, 
after running a correlation of decentralization variables that are likely to impact on poverty 
changes, it is necessary to run a correlation using data on widows and orphans of the genocide 
in order to examine whether poverty reduction is a result of decentralization or it is a simple 
recovery from the 1994 genocide. With regard to widows, the test indicates that the 
relationship between the presence of widows of the genocide and changes in poverty levels in a 
given district is weak (Pearson’s r=0.160). The relationship differs between rural and urban 
districts. In urban districts (Appendix D) the relationship is negatively stronger (Pearson’s r=-













Some districts (Kamonyi, Huye and Burera) which have fallen into poverty between 2001 and 
2006 have a high percentage of widows while others (Rubavu, Gicumbi and Nyagatare) which 
are in the same category have a low percentage of widows of the genocide. This is an indication 
that although the genocide was carried out across the country some districts have been more 
affected than others.   
Concerning the presence of orphans of the genocide the test indicates that the relationship 
between changes in poverty levels and the percentage of orphans of the genocide is weak and 
negative (Pearson’s r=-0.049). The relationship remains weak for urban districts (Pearson’s r=-
0.322) and very weak for rural districts (Pearson’s r=0.196). Bugesera remains the main outlier. 












explained by the percentage of orphans of the genocide in the affected districts. Thus, the 
impact of this factor was found to be very low.  
  
 
The impact of the presence of orphans on poverty levels vary according to the location of the 
districts. This can be explained by the fact that in urban districts orphans are more likely to get 
assistance while those in rural districts are not. Also in rural areas most orphans have access to 
means of production (land previously owned by their parents), while in urban areas many 
orphans do not have any means of livelihood. They are forced to rely on aid if they cannot work 
and this has an impact on the economy of the concerned districts.  
To be sure that all key variables continue to explain collectively the impact of decentralization 












model account for -0.031. The ANOVA shows that the overall significance of the model is 
p=0.547 and F=0.941.  The model indicates that voter turnout, number of cooperatives and 
access to water remained high with respectively -0.480, -0.363 and -0.222. However, orphans 
and district income per capita have higher score (-0.454 and -0.222) in the model while they 
scored low on the r (see Appendix F). When the location is considered, cooperatives, widows 
and access to water still remains best of poverty reduction in urban districts. In rural districts, 
change in health facilities, cooperative and change in secondary schools seem to contribute 
much in poverty reduction (see Appendix F).      
6.7. Conclusion  
The hypothesis postulates that decentralization and poverty are related. The statistical analysis 
has confirmed that few dimensions of decentralization correlate with changes in poverty levels. 
Only participation in local elections (as measured in 2006) (r=-0.295), the number of 
cooperatives per district (r=-0.469) and access to water (r=-0.353) correlate moderately with 
changes in poverty levels. The rest of the tested variables have a correlation which is weaker 
and close to zero. 
The correlation between variables related to decentralization and changes in levels of poverty 
suggests that decentralization (as a way of empowering people politically and as a tool of 
service delivery improvement) may help reduce poverty but not all actions undertaken by 
decentralized entities would necessarily lead to poverty reduction. Some of their activities 
would have an effect after a certain period. Some empirical results, as presented in this 












reduction can be explained by other factors, such as those likely to generate income, for 
































CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS  
The implementation of decentralization for the purpose of poverty reduction in Rwanda has 
seen mixed results. Those districts that have gone furthest in terms of administrative, political 
and fiscal decentralizations have managed to reduce poverty. On the other hand, other aspects 
of decentralization have had little or no measurable impact. Based on those results, the 
following conclusions can tentatively be drawn: 
 The study has not covered all aspects related to the analyzed topic; however, the author 
has tried to examine key aspects related to impact of decentralization on poverty 
reduction in Rwanda.  
 On the question of whether decentralization, conceptualized as a process of political 
empowerment and as a means of dispersing responsibility and authority, assists poverty 
reduction, It has been argued that better implementation of decentralization is more 
likely to contribute to poverty reduction in Rwanda. More extensive implementation of 
decentralization creates an enabling environment for empowerment and economic 
opportunities for local communities. 
 The analysis of the results on the impact of decentralization on poverty reduction in 
Rwanda over the period 2001 to 2006 was made by comparing results across all 30 
districts of Rwanda. The use of measures that can be replicated enabled the test of the 
hypothesis. This analysis may open the way for further academic research and provides 














A longitudinal research design involving a study of all 30 districts of Rwanda from 2001 and 
2006 was developed. The inclusion of all 30 districts enabled the researcher to test for 
correlations in order to demonstrate covariance between different dimensions of 
decentralization as measured in this study (those related to resource mobilization, 
participation, development investments, capacity and genocide legacy) and their potential 
influence on changes in poverty.  
The dependent variable was reframed as change in poverty level. This variable was obtained by 
subtracting the percentage of individuals indicated as living below the poverty line in 2001 from 
the percentage of individuals living below the poverty line in 2006. Poverty calculations are 
based on a food basket of commodities sufficient to provide 2500kcal per adult and non-food 
basic commodities. In this view, an individual is poor if his income does not allow access to both 
this amount of food and certain non food commodities (for Rwanda the poverty line is set at 64 
000frw). In this study the policy of decentralization was held constant. It attained the entire 
country equally. What differed, however, was the degree of implementation. Four major 
variables were used to measure its impact on poverty reduction: resource mobilization was 
measured by income per capita (tax income and government transfers) and expenditure per 
capita; participation was measured by the voter turnout in local elections and the number of 
cooperatives established; development investment was measured by per capita expenditure on 
education, health, water and roads, and by the availability of school and health infrastructure; 












measured by the percentage of orphans and widows in each district. Data on these key 
variables was gathered from district financial reports, EICV2000/2001 and EICV2005/2006 
surveys, reports from the Ministry of Education, Ministry of Health and Ministry of Commerce, 
the 2002 census and the 1994 census of genocide survivors.  
Decentralization may contribute to poverty reduction because of its unique capacity to 
effectively address local issues and satisfy local needs. Decentralization offers political space 
and opens opportunities for local communities.  
Empirical findings 
Testing of the hypothesis revealed that the level of voter turnout as an indication of political 
decentralization is related weakly and negatively to poverty levels. This test also revealed that 
the relationship between the level of voter turnout and change in poverty levels is moderately 
strong and negative in rural districts. 
Also, the test of the hypothesis revealed that the number of cooperatives in districts is 
correlated moderately strongly and negatively with subsequent changes in poverty. It was also 
observed that, the correlation is more strong in rural than in urban districts. This is a strong 
indication that access to social capital is an ingredient in poverty reduction and thus this 
confirms the theory of Putnam. 
The test of the hypothesis in relation to district government income and expenditure per capita 
revealed that these two variables are not very strongly related to subsequent levels in poverty 
change; and if there is a relationship, it is a weak one. This may be an indication that incomes 












level of income being low, most income is spent on current activities (Salaries, office 
equipment, etc.). 
When testing the hypothesis of local government capacity related to the level of education of 
district staff, empirical results show that the relationship is weak and moderately weak; 
however it is strong in urban districts. The test of the hypothesis indicates that expenditure per 
capita on education, health, water and roads correlate very weakly with change in poverty 
levels. The relationship between per capita expenditure and poverty reduction is moderately 
weak and positive in urban districts.  
It was also found that increased access to water correlated moderately strongly and negatively 
with change in poverty levels and relationship is strong in rural districts. 
The empirical test indicates that the availability of facilities such as primary and secondary 
schools is weakly related to the level of change in poverty. The relations are however 
moderately weak in urban districts for primary schools, and moderately weak and negative in 
rural districts for secondary schools. The relationship remained very weak for the link between 
changes in poverty and access to health facilities. 
Recommendations  
This analysis is systematic and transparent; it can therefore be replicated for it is reliable. Using 
indicators accepted widely, other researchers can undertake similar studies in different 
countries using different time periods. However there are limitations that need to be addressed 












 The major limitation is related to the definition of indicators and subsequent data on 
how to measure decentralization. This study largely utilized data from official 
government reports and offices. However these are not sufficient to measure the 
impact of decentralization on poverty reduction.  
 Also in a short period of 5 years, major changes may not occur. A more comprehensive 
study using data collected through a specific questionnaire over a greater period of time 
and including more well defined indicators would be conductive to more conclusive 
results. 
 From empirical evidence, it has been shown that the contribution of decentralization to 
poverty reduction has not been as extensive as expected; this is an indication that slow 
poverty reduction in Rwanda could be a result of a normal trend as defined by the 
macroeconomic status of the country in general and recovery from the 1994 genocide in 
particular. This leads to the recommendation that the government of Rwanda and 
development partners should focus not only on pro-poor policies but also on policies 
that support community participation in individual poverty reduction projects. This 
would help decentralization to reach the goal of reducing poverty within local 
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APPENDIX A: Projects financed by the Ubudehe Programme 2005-2006 and Amount (in FRW) 
          received by the District 
Table A 1: Projects financed by the Ubudehe Programme 2005-2006 




Animal husbandry 1740 1621 1451 1205 317 6334 75 
Drinking water 15 131 92 126 23 387 5 
Agriculture 11 81 63 169 5 329 4 
Roads 9 49 75 144 11 288 3 
Classrooms 83 95 74 24 2 278 3 
Radical terraces 0 21 2 149 0 172 2 
Community health scheme 0 95 57 18 0 170 2 
Microfinance 10 8 61 49 8 136 2 
Multipurpose homes  12 22 62 6 15 117 1 
Petty business 35 18 14 4 40 111 1 
Mills 13 13 11 8 2 47 0.4 
Storage Silos 7 5 7 8 0 27 0.3 
Electricity 0 24 0 0 1 25 0.3 
Handcrafts 2 1 1 2 6 14   
Tree nurseries   0 1 9 2 12   
Modern jikos 0 1 2 0 1 4   
Reforestation 0 4 0 0 0 4   
Dugouts 1 1 1 0 0 3   
Cultural troups 0 0 0 0 1 1   
Public secretariat 0 0 0 0 1 1   
Public phone ''Tuvugane" 1 0 0 0 0 1   
Total           8462 99  
Sources: Republic of Rwanda, Programme Ubudehe, Devis Programme No 1 (période 2005-2006), Septembre 2007 













Figure A1: Amount (in FRW) received by the District (Ubudehe Programme 2005-2006) 
 





























































% of ubudehe 
fund transferred 
compared to 
2001, 2002, 2003, 
2006 expenditure 
Bugesera 1,455,429,486 1,848,275,054 311,944,920 21.4 16.9 
Burera 1,655,790,596 2,000,433,783 198,242,408 12 9.9 
Gakenke 945,936,551 1,451,060,897 234,919,857 24.8 16.2 
Gasabo 1,491,878,783 2,695,794,357 216,618,631 14.5 8 
Gatsibo 1,351,336,065 1,738,547,814 145,001,248 10.7 8.3 
Gicumbi 2,331,466,552 2,787,830,125 381,484,642 16.4 13.7 
Gisagara 1,203,121,348 1,491,495,924 0 0 0 
Huye 2,246,786,052 2,777,324,506 51,887,536 2.3 1.9 
Kamonyi 1,194,035,339 1,448,697,901 225,184,053 18.9 15.5 
Karongi 2,003,727,963 2,348,023,718 288,625,850 14.4 12.3 
Kayonza 987,696,695 1,246,697,687 153,418,293 15.5 12.3 
Kicukiro 1,781,720,516 2,829,812,304 73,120,651 4.1 2.6 
Kirehe 582,799,634 784,538,297 159,334,645 27.3 20.3 
Muhanga 1,891,332,843 2,247,415,792 270,795,249 14.3 12 
Musanze 890,057,466 1,369,576,995 276,553,038 31.1 20.2 
Ngoma 1,865,246,465 2,064,148,660 176,109,062 9.4 8.5 
Ngororero 1,124,818,555 1,402,297,990 229,014,504 20.4 16.3 
Nyabihu 992,399,791 1,258,319,471 244,880,594 24.7 19.5 
Nyagatare 1,640,429,013 2,076,406,429 222,332,271 13.6 10.7 
Nyamagabe 1,940,285,027 2,317,021,127 369,150,564 19 15.9 
Nyamasheke 1,783,681,031 2,114,171,792 297,942,103 16.7 14.1 
Nyanza 1,564,457,134 1,894,766,445 59,787,438 3.8 3.2 
Nyarugenge 1,742,330,802 3,222,294,659 97,210,187 5.6 3 
Nyaruguru 878,505,083 1,113,709,682 175,841,609 20 15.8 
Rubavu 1,600,067,947 2,150,625,147 202,014,488 12.6 9.4 
Ruhango 1,254,027,212 1,533,262,196 265,462,723 21.2 17.3 
Rulindo 812,488,184 1,168,088,690 337,666,184 41.6 28.9 
Rusizi 1,862,581,413 2,295,699,203 262,989,032 14.1 11.5 
Rutsiro 1,270,885,031 1,538,546,913 157,557,431 12.4 10.2 
Rwamagana 1,536,838,024 1,812,808,541 203,447,555 13.2 11.2 











APPENDIX B: Formula of grant and earmarked funds 
Equation 1: Block grants transfer formula. 
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Ti  : Total transfer to district “i” 
T  : Total amount of block grant 
α1 …α5  : Allocation weights 
 !   : Population of District “i” 
"#$#%&   : Revenue per capita of district “i” 
&"#&   : Area of district “i” 
"#$%!' : Percentage increase in revenue collection of district “i” 
()*+&   : financing gap of district “i” (difference between its own revenues and its salary 
cost). 
 
Equation 2: Earmarked grant transfer formula 
The criteria distribute points as follows: 
• Transport infrastructures (25%) 
• Level of poverty (20%) 
• Energy, water and telecommunication infrastructures (15%) 
• Population size (10%) 
• Income generating infrastructures (10%) 
• Geographical configuration (10%) 
• Areas (5%) 










These criteria were not applied by CDF because the data which may serve to apply them were 
not available and the CDF reviewed the criteria by considering available data. The criteria are: 
• Population (20%) 
• Areas (10%) 
• Wellbeing (40%) 
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 : Population of Rwanda  
:: Population of the district “i” 
;: Rwandan area 
<: Area of the district  
=: Sum of wellbeing index 
>: Wellbeing index of a district 
?: Number of households in a district with no access to drinking water and electricity  
#: The sum of figures obtained 
B: Annual budget allocated to CDF 

















APPENDIX C: Correlations  
 




Change in poverty 
levels 2001-2006 





Voter turnout in local elections 2006 30 -0.295 0.087 
Number of cooperatives 30 -0.469 0.220 
Percentages of orphans 30 -0.049 0.002 
Percentages of widows 30 0.160 0.026 
Change in income per capita 2001-2006  30 -0.045 0.002 
Change in expenditure per capita 2001-2006 30 0.103 0.011 
Change in access to clean water 30 -0.353 0.125 
Total expenditure per capita on education 30 0.155 0.024 
Total expenditure per capita on health 30 -0.009 0.000 
Total expenditure per capita on water 30 -0.028 0.001 
Total expenditure per capita on roads 30 0.047 0.002 
Change in percentages of district personnel 
with university degree 2001-2006 30 0.068 0.005 
Change in primary schools per 1000 
inhabitants 2001-2006 30 -0.039 0.001 
Change in secondary schools per 1000 
inhabitants 2001-2006 30 -0.171 0.029 
Change in health facilities per 1000 













APPENDIX D: Correlations (Urban districts)  
 




Change in poverty 
levels 2001-2006 





Voter turnout in local elections 2006 16 -.160 0.026 
Number of cooperatives 16 -.116 0.013 
Percentages of orphans 16 -.322 0.104 
Percentages of widows 16 -.260 0.067 
Change in income per capita 2001-2006  16 -.148 0.022 
Change in expenditure per capita 2001-2006 16 .143 0.021 
Change in access to clean water 16 -.163 0.027 
Total expenditure per capita on education 16 .315 0.099 
Total expenditure per capita on health 16 -.072 0.005 
Total expenditure per capita on water 16 -.073 0.005 
Total expenditure per capita on roads 16 -.004 0.000 
Change in percentages of district personnel 
with university degree 2001-2006 16 -.053 0.003 
Change in primary schools per 1000 
inhabitants 2001-2006 16 .408 0.167 
Change in secondary schools per 1000 
inhabitants 2001-2006 16 -.001 0.000 
Change in health facilities per 1000 inhabitants 












APPENDIX E: Correlations (Rural districts) 




Change in poverty 
levels 2001-2006 





Voter turnout in local elections 2006 14 -.426 0.182 
Number of cooperatives 14 -0.650 0.423 
Percentages of orphans 14 .196 0.038 
Percentages of widows 14 .410 0.168 
Change in income per capita 2001-2006  14 .032 0.001 
Change in expenditure per capita 2001-2006 14 .036 0.001 
Change in access to clean water 14 -.481 0.232 
Total expenditure per capita on education 14 .017 0.000 
Total expenditure per capita on health 14 .012 0.000 
Total expenditure per capita on water 14 -.006 0.000 
Total expenditure per capita on roads 14 .088 0.008 
Change in percentages of district personnel 
with university degree 2001-2006 14 .218 0.048 
Change in primary schools per 1000 
inhabitants 2001-2006 14 -.264 0.070 
Change in secondary schools per 1000 
inhabitants 2001-2006 14 -.314 0.098 
Change in health facilities per 1000 











APPENDIX F: Multiple regression results 
Model Summary  
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate 
1 .709a .502 -.031 9.025 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Change in health facilities per 1000 inhabitants 2001-2006, Total expenditure per capita on 
education, Total expenditure per capita on roads, Change in primary schools per 1000 inhabitants 2001-2006, 
Change in percentages of district personnel with university degree 2001-2006, Change in access to clean water, 
Percentages of orphans, Total expenditure per capita on water, Number of cooperatives, Change in secondary 
schools per 1000 inhabitants 2001-2006, Total expenditure per capita on health, Voter turnout in local elections 2006, 
Change in expenditure per capita 2001-2006, Percentages of widows, Change in income per capita 2001-2006  
ANOVAb 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 1150.113 15 76.674 .941 .547a 
Residual 1140.355 14 81.454   
Total 2290.468 29    
a. Predictors: (Constant), Change in health facilities per 1000 inhabitants 2001-2006, Total expenditure per capita on 
education, Total expenditure per capita on roads, Change in primary schools per 1000 inhabitants 2001-2006, 
Change in percentages of district personnel with university degree 2001-2006, Change in access to clean water, 
Percentages of orphans, Total expenditure per capita on water, Number of cooperatives, Change in secondary 
schools per 1000 inhabitants 2001-2006, Total expenditure per capita on health, Voter turnout in local elections 2006, 
Change in expenditure per capita 2001-2006, Percentages of widows, Change in income per capita 2001-2006  



















Coefficients   
B 
Std. 
Error Beta t Sig. 
1 (Constant) 92.503 52.066   1.777 0.097 
Voter turnout in local elections 2006 -0.734 0.601 -0.480 -1.221 0.242 
Number of cooperatives -0.07 0.059 -0.363 -1.185 0.256 
Percentages of orphans -0.462 0.353 -0.454 -1.309 0.211 
Percentages of widows 0.467 0.814 0.234 0.574 0.575 
Change in income per capita 2001-2006  -0.003 0.005 -0.222 -0.49 0.632 
Change in expenditure per capita 2001-
2006 
0 0.002 0.028 0.069 0.946 
Change in access to clean water -0.263 0.388 -0.222 -0.678 0.509 
Total expenditure per capita on education 0 0.002 0.042 0.121 0.906 
Total expenditure per capita on health 0.001 0.007 0.027 0.081 0.936 
Total expenditure per capita on water -0.002 0.007 -0.108 -0.312 0.759 
Total expenditure per capita on roads 0.001 0.004 0.069 0.188 0.853 
Change in percentages of district personnel 
with university degree 2001-2006 
0.004 0.399 0.004 0.011 0.991 
Change in primary schools per 1000 
inhabitants 2001-2006 
1.515 41.405 0.011 0.037 0.971 
Change in secondary schools per 1000 
inhabitants 2001-2006 
-27.127 117.292 -0.069 -0.231 0.82 
Change in health facilities per 1000 
inhabitants 2001-2006 
-46.066 115.384 -0.194 -0.399 0.696 



















Model Summary  
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 1.000a 1.000 . . 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Change in health facilities per 1000 inhabitants 2001-2006, Total expenditure per capita on 
roads, Change in access to clean water, Change in expenditure per capita 2001-2006, Percentages of orphans, 
Change in secondary schools per 1000 inhabitants 2001-2006, Change in percentages of district personnel with 
university degree 2001-2006, Number of cooperatives, Total expenditure per capita on health, Change in primary 
schools per 1000 inhabitants 2001-2006, Total expenditure per capita on education, Voter turnout in local elections 
2006, Change in income per capita 2001-2006 , Percentages of widows, Total expenditure per capita on water 
ANOVAb 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 628.109 15 41.874 . .a 
Residual .000 0 .   
Total 628.109 15    
a. Predictors: (Constant), Change in health facilities per 1000 inhabitants 2001-2006, Total expenditure per capita on 
roads, Change in access to clean water, Change in expenditure per capita 2001-2006, Percentages of orphans, 
Change in secondary schools per 1000 inhabitants 2001-2006, Change in percentages of district personnel with 
university degree 2001-2006, Number of cooperatives, Total expenditure per capita on health, Change in primary 
schools per 1000 inhabitants 2001-2006, Total expenditure per capita on education, Voter turnout in local elections 
2006, Change in income per capita 2001-2006 , Percentages of widows, Total expenditure per capita on water 




















Coefficients   
B Std. Error Beta t Sig. 
1 (Constant) -226.464 0.000   . . 
Voter turnout in local elections 2006 -0.683 0.000 -0.641 . . 
Number of cooperatives -0.205 0.000 -1.215 . . 
Percentages of orphans 2.769 0.000 4.337 . . 
Percentages of widows -6.037 0.000 -3.786 . . 
Change in income per capita 2001-2006  -0.004 0.000 -0.557 . . 
Change in expenditure per capita 2001-2006 -0.001 0.000 -0.323 . . 
Change in access to clean water -3.414 0.000 -3.873 . . 
Total expenditure per capita on education -0.006 0.000 -1.182 . . 
Total expenditure per capita on health -0.014 0.000 -0.717 . . 
Total expenditure per capita on water 0.067 0.000 3.858 . . 
Total expenditure per capita on roads 0.014 0.000 1.376 . . 
Change in percentages of district personnel 
with university degree 2001-2006 
2.684 0.000 3.192 . . 
Change in primary schools per 1000 
inhabitants 2001-2006 
366.743 0.000 3.18 . . 
Change in secondary schools per 1000 
inhabitants 2001-2006 
-481.168 0.000 -1.825 . . 
Change in health facilities per 1000 
inhabitants 2001-2006 
47.055 0.000 0.331 . . 
a. Dependent Variable: Change in poverty level  2001-2006 
 
RURAL 
Model Summary  
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 1.000a 1.000 . . 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Change in health facilities per 1000 inhabitants 2001-2006, Number of cooperatives, 
Change in income per capita 2001-2006 , Percentages of widows, Change in percentages of district personnel with 
university degree 2001-2006, Voter turnout in local elections 2006, Change in secondary schools per 1000 










expenditure per capita on health, Percentages of orphans, Change in primary schools per 1000 inhabitants 2001-
2006, Total expenditure per capita on water 
ANOVAb 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 1652.864 13 127.143 . .a 
Residual .000 0 .   
Total 1652.864 13    
a. Predictors: (Constant), Change in health facilities per 1000 inhabitants 2001-2006, Number of cooperatives, 
Change in income per capita 2001-2006 , Percentages of widows, Change in percentages of district personnel with 
university degree 2001-2006, Voter turnout in local elections 2006, Change in secondary schools per 1000 
inhabitants 2001-2006, Total expenditure per capita on education, Total expenditure per capita on roads, Total 
expenditure per capita on health, Percentages of orphans, Change in primary schools per 1000 inhabitants 2001-
2006, Total expenditure per capita on water 




























Coefficients   
B Std. Error Beta t Sig. 
1 (Constant) 494.087 0.000   . . 
Voter turnout in local elections 2006 0.123 0.000 0.056 . . 
Number of cooperatives -0.408 0.000 -1.968 . . 
Percentages of orphans 0.095 0.000 0.061 . . 
Percentages of widows 0.038 0.000 0.016 . . 
Change in income per capita 2001-2006  0.206 0.000 2.66 . . 
Total expenditure per capita on education -0.015 0.000 -1.459 . . 
Total expenditure per capita on health -0.006 0.000 -0.26 . . 
Total expenditure per capita on water 0.115 0.000 4.818 . . 
Total expenditure per capita on roads -0.052 0.000 -4.811 . . 
Change in percentages of district personnel with 
university degree 2001-2006 
-4.936 0.000 -2.889 . . 
Change in primary schools per 1000 inhabitants 2001-
2006 
256.761 0.000 1.599 . . 
Change in secondary schools per 1000 inhabitants 
2001-2006 
-1644.79 0.000 -2.901 . . 
Change in health facilities per 1000 inhabitants 2001-
2006 
-2057.71 0.000 -3.496 . . 
a. Dependent Variable: Change in poverty levels 2001-2006 
 
